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ABSTRACT 
 Over the last few decades, a number of Islamist groups, some listed as terrorist, 
have increasingly participated in political elections and shown a pattern of moderation. 
What explains the move away from violence to achieve group goals? Analyzing three 
cases, Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Hamas in the 
occupied Palestinian territories, this thesis examines the causes of moderation and 
willingness to participate in existing political structures. Using aspects of social 
movement theory, it is argued that institutionalization and interests of maintaining 
membership explain why, when political opportunities arise, Islamist groups take the 
democratic path and forego violence. The conclusions aid in promoting democracy in the 
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I. ISLAMISTS AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The United States’ global war on terrorism considers the adversary any group or 
non-state actor which elects to use extreme violence, at times indiscriminately against 
civilians, to achieve its goals. A number of Islamist groups use or have used such extreme 
violence to achieve political goals. The United States and others label these groups as 
terrorist or extremist. The terrorist label carries with it an assumption that all groups who 
have used or may use extreme measures to achieve their goals, political or other wise, are 
equal in terms of operation, organization, motivation and membership. Labeling these 
groups as extremist or terrorist forecloses all possible diplomatic negotiations, a result 
which may counter foreign policy goals for deterring violence and promoting democracy.  
While supporters of the global war on terrorism deem these organizations 
perennially violent, what explains signs of their moderation or willingness to forego 
violence and work within existing political structures? Could democratic participation be 
so attractive to Islamists they eschew non-democratic methods of achieving their goals? 
Islamic activism refers to collective action, extreme or moderate, using Islamic terms, 
symbols and identities. Islamic activism can take the form of political movements to 
establish an Islamic state, opposition against a repressive regime or a social movement to 
promote stronger adherence to Islam within society.1 Though these groups are Islamic 
and their members are predominantly Muslim, not all groups exist to merely conduct 
extreme or terrorist attacks against a ruling regime, government or society. I suggest a 
more complex interaction is taking place between the Islamic group, the state, and others 
who support them. I investigate the moderating potential of groups which have used 
violence by analyzing the trajectories of Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt, and Hamas in the occupied Palestinian territories. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism, Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2004, 2. 
2 
B. DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Middle East is thought to have been left behind as periodic waves of 
democratization swept across the globe. The most recent wave involved the Eastern 
European countries of the former Soviet Union that seemed to transition almost overnight 
into democracies. It seemed so easy any country could become a democracy. Historically, 
however, stable democratic transition has not happened in a rapid manner. Lasting 
democracy has happened over a long time period through gradual and incremental 
processes shaped by bottom-up societal pressure and piecemeal reforms.2 
Research identifies authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes as the main 
barriers to democracy in the Middle East. These regimes control oil wealth, the coercive 
use of force, and other means of repression. Many countries in the region were at one 
time colonized by European states and, when granted independence, transitioned to 
authoritarian forms of government. The authoritarian regimes were supported by the 
West and were under no pressure to reform. Pressure from within has taken place, to 
some extent, and a number of Arab regimes implemented limited reforms during the 
1980s. Reforms include the emergence or reemergence of parliaments and other forms of 
legislative bodies. Such legislatures play an important role in the political environment 
and serve as a legitimate voice of opposition when given the opportunity.3 
Islamist opposition movements, emerging during the last few decades, have also 
become a force for change. In some cases, Islamist movements act as a strong political 
force working with, or parallel to, a number of Arab regimes. Moderate and radical 
Islamist groups continue to demonstrate a willingness to participate in the legislative 
branch of government when given the opportunity. Islamists attract wide popular support 
through grassroots civil society institutions which improve social welfare and offer an 
alternative form of government purportedly free from corruption and Western influence.4 
 
                                                 
2 Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: The 
Resurgence of Democratic Institutions, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, 249. 
3 Ibid., 1. 
4 Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway, “Islamist Movements and the Democratic 
Process in the Arab World:  Exploring the Gray Zones,” Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series no. 67, 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2006, 3. 
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C. ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
Over the last few decades, a number of Islamist movements have participated in 
local and national elections. I investigate to what extent this apparent moderation 
influences the potential for democracy. In doing so, I contribute to the wider body of 
literature concerning the prospects for democracy in the Middle East. I hypothesize that, 
when given the opportunity, Islamist groups are somewhat willing to operate within 
existing state structures, forego violence, and promote democratic processes as a means 
to advance their goals. To support this hypothesis, I use aspects of social movement 
theory and political system dynamics to examine the origin, transformation, and future 
potential for Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Hamas in 
Gaza and the West Bank. Specifically, I consider how the goal of sustaining and 
expanding the movement entailed changing the organization’s goals and tactics in light of 
the new political opportunities. I also examine regime responses to Islamist tactics. A 
regime may choose to reform the political process creating a more democratic 
environment or change the electoral system’s design to guarantee regime security. 
Increased understanding of Islamist groups in general, but specifically those 
willing to participate in political institutions, could lead to improved prospects for 
democracy. Islamist influence on the spread of democratic processes may be of vital 
interest in fostering United States’ objectives in the region. For those willing to 
participate in politics, there is an opportunity for them to become an active and accepted 
part of the system. In other words, they can be institutionalized and no longer excluded. 
This institutionalization can bode positively for the development of democratic 
institutions and signal the group’s abandonment of violence.  
D. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY FRAMEWORK 
 Social movement theory (SMT) provides a multi-dimensional framework to aid in 
conceptualizing the interaction of movements and political processes. This analysis can 
also be applied to groups or organization within a larger social movement like Islamic 
4 
activism. Social movement theory focuses on three primary aspects:  political 
opportunities, mobilizing structure or resource mobilization, and framing processes.5 
 Social movements operate within a dynamic political environment. Ziad Munson 
suggests four aspects of a dynamic political environment include: state repression, 
political access, divisions among elite and influential allies.6 To operate in this dynamic 
political environment, social movements must repeatedly challenge the power holder (i.e. 
authoritarian regime) and show that their support base remains “worthy, unified, 
numerous, and committed.”7 Worthy or worthiness characterizes the rationale behind a 
movements actions or challenge. The majority of supporters must see the challenge as 
just held up by higher moral standards. Unity refers to a common identity or bond 
displayed through symbols, rhetoric, or actions like marching together in demonstration. 
Numerous refers to the size of the movements support base and its ability to substantiate 
claims of support. The size of a movements support base can be demonstrated through 
petitions, open public demonstrations, or election results for example. The last 
characteristic is commitment which is demonstrated through repeated and persistent 
action. Action could range from public speaking demonstrations to suicide bombings. 
 Social movements can either avoid or adapt to take advantage of changes within a 
political environment. An opening in the political environment would allow movements 
to form a political party or allow members to compete in elections. Participation in the 
political system may even lead to institutionalization. Once institutionalized the 
movement becomes part of the system. For Islamic activists, who use extreme violence as 
part of their repertoire, they likely must forego violence becoming more moderate in 
order to remain a legitimate part of the system. To reinforce this idea, scholars, suggest 
                                                 
5 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, “Introduction:  Opportunities, Mobilizing 
Structures, and Framing Processes—Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements,” 
in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; 
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing, New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, 2. 
6 Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood,” The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 4, 2001, 494. 
7 Charles Tilly, “Agendas For Students of Social Movements,” in States, Parties, and Social 
Movements, ed., Jack A. Goldstone, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 250. 
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that social movements “are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and 
opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded.”8  
 For a movement to exist and take advantage of political opportunities it must 
mobilize members and other resources. Mobilizing structures are the means by which 
groups are built, organized, and supported. Mobilizing structures are the “collective 
vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in 
collective action”9 Examples of mobilizing structures that may be exploited for collective 
action purposes are mosques, educational institutions, and existing social networks. 
Collective action however, comes at a price. Costs of collective action include time, 
incentives, money, and the willingness to risk repression from leaders and regimes which 
control the operating environment.10 
 Collective action can not take place without human resources. People must be 
recruited and retained to maintain an effective movement. Mobilization literature 
contains two theories of recruitment, which use different assumptions to understand the 
motives that drive collective action. The first theory, based on the rational actor model of 
human behavior, contends that movements attract new members by appealing to 
individual interests through incentives--material, psychological, and/or emotional 
benefits that are contingent upon participation. The weakness in this recruitment theory is 
that it provides no insight as to why members stay committed to the movement. The 
second recruitment theory suggests individuals join to demonstrate commitment to a 
belief or cause that is in the mind of the individual greater than one’s self. 11 Under the 
second theory, movement leaders can mobilize individuals into action by “issuing a ‘call 
to arms’ or normative rationale for collective action—a process described by Robert 
Benford and David Snow as ‘motivational framing’.”12 The motivational framing for 
Islamic activists then, by this line of thought, comes from Islam. 
                                                 
8 McAdam et al, 3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Jennifer Chandler, “The Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory,” Strategic Insights, vol. 4, 
no. 5, May 2005, 3. 
11 Carrie Wickham, “Interests, Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt,” in Islamic Activism, ed. 
Quintan Wiktorowicz, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004, 231-232. 
12 Ibid. 
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 A number of Islamic activist groups have been studied; resulting in some general 
observable trends across groups. In particular to explain how these organizations make 
contact to recruit members, Carrie Wickham’s research on Islamic activism in Egypt 
provides an explanation. She found that “the presence of Islamist networks at the local 
level where people lived, studied, and worked made them highly accessible and 
minimized the social distance between participants and non-participants.”13 Daily 
personal contact facilitated the decision to join the group.  
 Becoming a member of an Islamist activity does not always require a member to 
sever prior social ties, thus minimizing disruption to existing social ties and maintains an 
opening to reach other potential recruits.14 In addition to having relative freedom to join, 
the newly formed social ties offered by an Islamic network allows a certain amount of 
flexibility in commitment. Joining without the demand for absolute commitment allows 
members to experiment with different levels of participation while keeping existing 
social ties with non-activists. 
 The low-level commitment to join an Islamist movement explains initial 
involvement in low-risk forms of activism; however, it does not explain how deeper 
organizational commitment is formed and with it the willingness to participate in 
extremely high risk political forms of activism like suicide bombing. “To facilitate a 
progression toward high-risk activism, Islamists frame activism as a moral ‘obligation’ 
that demands self-sacrifice and unflinching commitment to the cause of religious 
transformation.”15 The moral obligation or religious duty allows individuals to internalize 
the goals of the organization.  
 Framing is the internalizing mechanism that takes a social movement and makes it 
personal for its members. A more elaborate definition of framing is: “conscious strategic 
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”16 Through this process 
members have a personal bond, shared belief or identity that motivates collective 
                                                 
13 Wickham, 233. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 232.  
16 McAdam et al., 6. 
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action.17 Common frames associated with social movements include a sense of injustice 
and conflict within a religious ideology. In the case of injustice, what motivates people is 
not only the fact that they see and define their situation as unjust but also that they see the 
opportunity for change.18 The transition process from idea to movement, in this case, is 
referred to as “adopting an injustice frame” or when people come to the conclusion that 
something in their environment violates their moral standards—“of what is right, just, 
fair—that they must engage in collective action to correct it.”19 To determine that your 
moral standards have been violated one must posses a set of fundamental moral standards 
which can be violated. For a movement to take place versus just a personal sense of being 
wronged the set of morale standards must be common among others in the same 
environment.20  
 Religion can provide the fundamental set of moral standards for the individual 
and the group which seeks to mobilize. Religion, therefore, is a powerful framing tool for 
social mobilization. “Religion not only can help to generate and define the grievances 
that breed disruptive collective activism, it can also supply the symbolic and emotional 
resources needed to sustain the activism over time.”21 Social movements need symbols, 
rituals, and narratives to create collective identities, build solidarity, express grievances, 
and draw inspiration and strength in difficult times. In this sense, religion a custodian of 
“powerful symbols, rituals, icons, narratives, songs, testimonies, and oratory” lends itself 
well to the causes of activism.22 
 Framing does not have to be as complex as religion. It can be a simple slogan as 
in TV commercials, bumper stickers, or car magnets. One in particular is the yellow 
ribbon car magnet “Support Our Troops”. This arouses mental images of the     
September 11, 2001 attack, invasion of Afghanistan to stop the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, 
sending forces to Baghdad to stop Saddam Hussein, or a reminder that sons, daughters, 
                                                 
17 McAdam et al, 5. 
18 Christian Smith, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In,” in Disruptive 
Religion, ed. Christian Smith, New York: Routledge, 1996, 10. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 10-11. 
22 Ibid., 11. 
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and friends are fighting for democracy and freedom. The purpose is to rally support for 
the cause and keep it fresh or persistent in the minds of its members and potential 
members. In this manner framing plays a key role in recruitment and retention of 
members.23 
For an Islamist movement, a means of establishing a frame to mobilize around is 
the issuing of a fatwa (Islamic legal opinion). A fatwa can provide rationale for action 
and/or direct actions which must be carried out to fulfill the goals of the group. Usama 
Bin Laden’s fatwa calling for jihad is a good example.  
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.  Survey of Literature and Major Debates 
A debate exists among scholars and experts as to whether Islamist groups are 
irrational terrorists or rational actors who use extreme measures at times to achieve 
rational goals. Much of the academic literature suggests these organizations are in fact 
well organized and rational. Actions by more radical Islamist groups such as Gamma al-
Islamiyya in Egypt failed to force lasting political change. Their actions could not 
overcome responses in the form of regime brutality and in some instances public 
backlash.24 As a result, a number of Islamist movements have become less violent, 
embraced pragmatism and democratic procedures to generate public support and lasting 
political change. 
 Some Islamist movements in Morocco, Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, and 
Egypt--the Muslim Brotherhood specifically--see the benefit in peacefully seeking 
political power and working within the existing political system to promote gradual 
democratic transformation instead of insisting on a theocratic state.25 These same 
Islamists feel, to some extent, that Islam is compatible with democratic principles, rule of 
law, and human rights. Islamists may never accept the term secular but their actions 
parallel the notion when they refer to the civility of the public sphere. No matter what the 
rhetoric, one fundamental issue remains constant - the insistence that Islam must guide all 
                                                 
23 Wickham, 232. 
24 Ray Takeyh, “Faith-Based Initiatives: Can Islam Bring democracy to the Middle East?,” Foreign 
Policy, no. 127, November-December 2001, 68. 
25 Amr Hamzawy, “The Key to Arab Reform: Moderate Islamists,” Policy Brief no. 40, Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2005, 1. 
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actions. Emphasis on Islam promotes a distinctive religion-based political perception and 
sustains to a great extent the popular appeal of Islamists in the region.26 
 Although popular appeal for Islamism is significant, it is the opportunity to 
participate in the political system that encourages moderation. Much literature supports 
this idea and specifically identifies Islamists’ inclusion in the political sphere as a key 
step in the process. Inclusion in the political sphere offers the ability to realize the 
challenges of managing contemporary society and provides Islamists the opportunity to 
address socio-cultural issues. Political participation, which furthers pragmatism and 
promotes democratic reform, has become a central component of the Islamist agenda.27 
 As the political reform process moves forward, authoritarian regimes may 
question their ability to remain in control of the system. In fact, some regimes have 
pulled back or constrained political opportunities in order to reaffirm their power. A 
restriction of nonviolent or moderate Islamists from the political sphere may only serve to 
roll back progress, empower more radical forces and hinder any chance for democratic 
transformation.28 Authoritarian regimes are forced to balance control and political 
opportunity to remain in power. A wrong decision or bad timing may cause results 
similar to the Iranian Revolution with the removal of the Shah of Iran. Regimes could be 
overthrown if they delay political reform; however they risk being voted out of power if 
they reform too quickly.29 
 Amr Hamzawy, an Egyptian political scientist with the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, encourages the United States and Europe to seek an alliance with 
moderate Islamists but also warns against cooperation with more extreme groups like 
Hamas and Hizbullah. He suggests Hamas and Hizbullah are an interesting contrast to 
moderate Islamists. Hamas and Hizbullah are known for their militant resistance but they 
also have political branches within their organizations. These groups have demonstrated a 
capacity to transform and adhere to the rules of the political game in their respective 
states. This contradicts the thesis that Islamists are incapable of rational nonviolent acts, a 
                                                 
26 Hamzawy, 2. 
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996, 3. 
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thesis which inhibits democratic liberalization. Since 1992, Hizbullah has put forth 
candidates for the Lebanese parliament. Hamas, in 2005, won a victory in the Palestinian 
municipal elections gaining overwhelming support in Gaza and considerable support in 
the West Bank. Unlike moderate Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood, these groups 
have not completely sworn off the use of violence. Hamzawy warns that the eagerness of 
Islamist groups to be active participants in the political process should be met with 
cautious optimism. Various Islamist groups may truly support a democratic process while 
others may only be using the process to seize political power. 
 Scholars and policymakers try to distinguish between radical (or extremist) and 
moderate Islamism, though it is difficult to define moderate. One leading scholar suggests 
“[m]oderation denotes those Islamic groups and activists who formally declare their 
respect for, and commitment to, pluralism and democratic principle and renounce the use 
of violence in achieving their objectives.”30 For the purpose of this research, moderate is 
defined as the willingness to pursue peaceful means like political participation to achieve 
organizational goals. The moderate-radical spectrum does not address the concern that 
seemingly moderate groups may in fact be hiding their radical agenda to gain a position 
of authority and shed the cloak of democracy. The phrase “one person, one vote, one 
time” expresses the fear that Islamists, once elected, would not relinquish political control 
through democratic means. 
 Sivan points out that some Islamists maintain the argument that democracy and 
Islam are compatible based on the principle of shura (consultation to elect a leader or 
caliph). Others disagree with this argument on the grounds it is not historically accurate. 
He also points out that shura has never truly been implement, even during the Golden 
Age of Islam. Shura during this period was limited to a select group of elites or learned 
ones. Opposition to shura-based democracy suggests what is needed is to open the gate to 
ijtihad, or individual interpretation, to develop or combine the notion of shura with 
modern pluralistic values.31 
                                                 
30  Jillian Schwedler, “A Paradox of Democracy? Islamist Participation in Elections,” Middle East 
Report, Winter 1998, 27. 
31 Emmanuel Sivan, “Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Taking Over Governments” in Barry Rubin, ed., 
Revolutionaries and Reformers, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2003, 8. 
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 In countries where the government chooses heavy-handed repression to deal with 
mainstream Islamist movements, the movement’s internal reformers lose out. The 
influence of the reformers within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has increased when 
the government has allowed some political participation and decreased when the 
government became more repressive strengthening the movement’s hard-liners. 
Therefore, increased political opportunity and an open political system may encourage 
Islamic activist groups to change even further.32 
 The potential for change towards democracy seems favorable according to a Pew 
Global Attitudes Project survey. The survey results indicate people surveyed in 
predominantly Muslim countries are not opposed to aspects of democracy and see Islam 
beginning to have a greater influence on state politics. However, those surveyed did 
express a cautious concern about Islamic extremists gaining greater political control.33 
An interesting result of the survey was that in predominantly Muslim countries those 
surveyed believe that democracy is possible. Those surveyed in Morocco (83%), 
Lebanon (83%), Jordan (80%), Turkey (48%) and Pakistan (43%) feel democracy can 
work in their country and is not a form of government reserved for the West. Democracy 
and what constitutes a democratic environment can be defined in various ways. For this 
research, I accept Robert Dahl’s minimalist definition of democracy common in 
academic literature. Dahl’s definition emphasizes human rights, open society, and a 
representative government.34 As stated above, there is some concern about the increasing 
role of Islam in government. A significant number in each of the predominantly Muslim 
countries surveyed, except for Jordan, felt Islamic extremism may pose a threat in their 
countries.35 
 
                                                 
32 Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway, 19. 
33 Pew Research, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics,” Pew 
Global Attitudes Project, July 14, 2005, <www.pewglobal.org/reports/>, 1. 
34 Robert Dahl suggests a democratic government includes: (1) representative decision makers elected 
by the people; (2) representatives or elected officials selected through frequent, fair, and open elections free 
of coercion; (3) freedom of expression for citizens without fear of repression from government or 
ideological groups; (4) access to alternative and/or independent sources of information and media; (5) the 
right to form parties, associations, or other autonomous organizations; (6) equal rights which include the 
right to vote, compete for and hold political office, and ability to pursue opportunities available to other 
citizens. Robert Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998, 85-86. 
35 Pew Research, 2. 
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2.  Major Argument 
 What explains the willingness of Islamist groups, like the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hizbullah, and Hamas, to moderate and become active participants in state 
political systems? When regimes choose to allow Islamists into electoral politics, for 
whatever reason, the groups often seize the opportunity. I argue that this change in tactic 
is due to Islamists’ institutionalization within society and the need to maintain a strong 
support base.  
F. PLAN OF STUDY 
This thesis investigates to what extent Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and Hamas in the occupied territories have become less violent 
while pursuing more democratic means. These groups in some ways act more like 
political parties promoting a democratic political environment in their country. Social 
movement theory provides a framework to better understand how these groups have 
achieved their goals and sustained their movement over time. Efforts to sustain and 
expand have to some extent altered organizational goals and tactics as well as the regime 
environment in which they operate. The thesis focuses on how Islamist tactics change to 
take advantage of political opportunities.  
 Chapter II presents the case of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Hizbullah, since the end of 
the Lebanese civil war, has taken steps to transform into a political movement yet retain a 
substantial military capability. Hizbullah demonstrates a willingness to work within the 
Lebanese system promoting democratic principles and government reform in order to 
advance its goals and maintain support. The external security threat from Israel which 
gave rise to Hizbullah remains an obstacle to its disarmament. The extent to which 
Hizbullah will transform beyond its current state depends upon this on-going external 
conflict. In the event Israel and Lebanon remain mobilized for war, Hizbullah’s 
increasing democratic character will be stunted. 
 Chapter III presents the case of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Brotherhood 
has experienced a transition from nonviolence to violence and back to nonviolence again. 
Since 1981, the Brotherhood has adhered to nonviolent means to pursue its goals. The 
group’s willingness to participate in Egypt’s political process suggests there is an 
opportunity to become institutionalized into the political system. The Mubarak regime 
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limits political opportunity and the Muslim Brotherhood is not allowed to participate as 
an officially recognized political party. Regime constraints have not seemed to hamper 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to gain seats in parliament. Brotherhood success in 
parliamentary elections should signal the regime that the potential for political change or 
unrest may be on the horizon. For the moment, further democratic advancement in Egypt 
resides in the hands of the Mubarak regime. 
 Chapter IV looks at the case of Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. The SMT 
framework assisted in understanding the political opportunities, mobilizing structures and 
framing processes used by Hamas to gain power. Results indicate it is too soon to tell to 
what extent Hamas is willing to further moderate. Ongoing conflict with Israel and 
Hamas’ hard-line stance is likely to prevent diplomatic negotiations. Hamas’ ability to 
gain a controlling majority in parliament has however, significantly changed the political 
landscape and brought an end to Fatah’s political monopoly. While Hamas may not 
become entirely nonviolent, its contribution to democratic transition is likely to be a 
lasting one, promoting the idea of elections and popular sovereignty within Palestinian 
society. 
 Chapter V builds upon the evidence presented throughout the thesis and clarifies 
to what extent and under what conditions Islamic activist groups are likely to adopt non-
violent means to achieve their goals. In addition, this chapter summarizes the impact of 
political system dynamics in promoting or preventing democracy. Lastly, the chapter 
suggests changes to United States foreign policy related to Islamist movements and 
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II. LEBANON AND HIZBULLAH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, Hizbullah has actively provided social 
programs as well as participated in local and national government. Hizbullah increased its 
political participation in order to maintain its support base. In essence, Hizbullah 
transformed itself into a political movement with a militant component. Hizbullah 
suggests a willingness to disarm when and if the Lebanese government can provide 
security for all Lebanon. However, on-going conflict between Israel and Lebanon 
provides justification for a Hizbullah deterrent force. Still, Hizbullah appears likely to 
continue promoting democratic processes within Lebanon albeit hindered by its 
unwillingness to disarm. This may prevent a deeper democratic transition. 
 Why and to what extent has Hizbullah changed tactics? In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Hizbullah was one of the most feared Islamist groups. The name brings images of an 
attack on the United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, airplane hijackings, and 
hostage taking. This view differs from the one many Lebanese hold. Has Hizbullah 
become just another political party in the Lebanese government? The alternative is that 
Hizbullah is merely laying low after the events of September 11, 2001 and will reemerge 
as a violent actor at a suitable moment in time. This chapter seeks to answers those 
questions and in doing so provide a better understanding of the extent to which Hizbullah 
has become more moderate. Facts on the ground indicate Hizbullah has been successful 
in achieving its stated objectives. Objectives include creating better social conditions for 
Shi’ites and deterring Israeli aggression. Hizbullah remains resilient and continues to 
endure verbal onslaught from its opponents.36 Harb and Leenders suggest strictly labeling 
Hizbullah a terrorist group or a political party is misleading and does not do justice to the 
organization’s complexity. Hizbullah has carefully adapted over the past two decades 
operating as a holistic and integrated network. Its actions and rhetoric are wrapped in an 
interrelated religious and political framework.37 
                                                  
36 Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know thy Enemy: Hizbullah, Terrorism and the Politics of 
Perception,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1, 2005, 174.   
37 Ibid. 
16 
B. RISE OF HIZBULLAH 
1.  Hizbullah Formation and Ideology 
 Hizbullah or “the Party of God” had a profound impact on the Islamic world when 
it emerged between 1982 and 1985. This group of Lebanese Shi’ite Muslims gained fame 
as a result of its use of violence to include:  suicide bombings, airliner hijackings, hostage 
taking and its confrontation with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Hizbullah was an 
encouragement to other Islamic activist groups as it engaged the IDF occupying southern 
Lebanon forcing an initial retreat and later complete withdrawal.38 Israeli troop 
withdrawal was significant because it made Hizbullah the first group to wage a successful 
insurgency against the IDF. Also significant was its ability to achieve this feat so quickly 
after becoming a movement. 
 Hizbullah emerged due to a combination of domestic and international factors.  
Domestically, conditions for Shi’ite political activism were building since Lebanon 
gained independence. Shi’ite activism really took form in the 1960s due to the leadership 
of Imam Musa al-Sadr. Al-Sadr, backed by Iran, established a number of charitable 
institutions and created the Higher Shi’ite Islamic Council. This council, led by al-Sadr, 
not only focused on the local concerns of the Shi’ite community but also provided them a 
voice at the state level. Not satisfied with the Lebanese political system, al-Sadr next 
established the Movement of the Disinherited (harakat al-mahrumin) in 1974 to address 
issues of reform. While the Movement of the Disinherited was a Shi’ite political 
movement, it called for government reform and social justice for all Lebanese. Outbreak 
of civil war in 1975 changed the domestic environment. Civil war reinforced sectarian 
division and brought about various armed militia groups. Al-Sadr’s movement developed 
its own militia wing known as Amal. In 1978, al-Sadr disappeared while on a trip to 
Libya. After al-Sadr’s disappearance, Amal became increasingly secular. As a result, a 
group of Islamic clerics led by Hussein Musawi broke away and formed their own 
Islamic movement. This splinter group, guided by clerics trained in Najaf with Ayatollah 
Khomeini, was responsible for the later formation of Hizbullah. 39  
                                                 
38 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” in Islamic Activism, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004, 125. 
39 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbullah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005, 
22-23. 
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 In addition to domestic factors, international influence from Syria and Iran on the 
Shi’ite community played a role in the rise of Hizbullah. As the war progressed, Syria 
aligned its support with the Muslim community and Iran to be in a position to regain the 
Golan Heights, lost to Israel in the 1967 war. Syria also sought to maintain an influence 
in Lebanon’s future government. Iran supported the Shi’ites in order to expand its 
political influence and further its goals of removing Israel and western influence in the 
region. Syria provided security and Iran provided funds necessary to mobilize and train 
Hizbullah fighters. The conflict between Israeli and Palestinian fighters in southern 
Lebanon, followed by civil war, took a toll on the Shi’ite community. Many Shi’ites were 
forced to relocate to Beirut after losing their homes and jobs. Iran’s funding of Hizbullah 
provided young unemployed men with the means to provide for their families thus 
increasing the incentive to join.40 
 Beyond funding, Iran played a large role in shaping Hizbullah’s ideology. The 
success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 caused a demonstration effect for Islamic 
activism (Shi’ite and Sunni) across the Middle East. Iran found Shi’ites in Lebanon 
responsive to its Islamic revolutionary message. According to Hamzeh, Lebanese Shi’ite 
ideology dates back prior to the Iranian Revolution when meetings or circles of learning 
(al-hawzat al-ilmiyyah) between Shi’ite clergy from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon took place. 
The hawzet laid the foundation for commonalities in ideology, and built a network of 
kinship, personal friendship, and politico-religious structures. A number of men involved 
in these hawzats had a significant influence on Shi’ite ideologies--Ayatollahs Ruhallah 
Khomeini, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, cousin of Musa al-Sadr, and mullah Mohammad 
Hussein Fadlallah. 41  
 After the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1978, the Lebanese militant 
sheikhs turned to Khomeini for guidance and leadership.42 When Ayatollah Khomeini 
came to power in 1979 he became the leader of Shi’ites both inside and outside Iran. 
Hizbullah’s guiding ideology is patterned after the ideology of Ayatollah Ruhallah 
                                                 
40 Harik, 38-40. 
41 Demonstration effect occurs when an event in one place acts as a catalyst or trigger for like events 
in another place at approximately the same point in time. Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 
New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004, 18. 
42 Ahmad Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, 19. 
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Khomeini and enhanced by its own themes and ideologues: Seyyed Mohammad 
Fadlallah, Seyyed Hasan Nasrallah and Sheikh Na’im Qasim. Ahmed Hamzeh highlights 
an interesting point in that while Fadlallah initially contributed to Hizbullah’s ideology he 
disagreed with the acceptance of Khomeini’s marja’yyah (framework or reference) as 
supreme marji (leader) in 1989.43 As a result, Fadlallah’s influence upon Hizbullah’s 
rank and file was marginalized. 
 The Khomeini ideology of wilayat al-faqih (jurisconsult) is a distinct Shi’ite 
political, legal, and religious doctrine which contains a “salvation prescription of 
primordial values, beliefs, and practices that are to shape the actions and the future of the 
intended Islamic order, as interpreted and mandated by the jurisconsult.”44 This doctrine 
calls for the “necessity of an Islamic order, rooted in a restored theory of guardianship of 
the jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih), in which the Islamic masses bear the banner of holy 
struggle (jihad) against local and foreign oppressors and for the liberation of Jerusalem 
and the spread of social justice.”45 
 Today, Hizbullah’s internal organization combines political and military 
structures guided by the wilayat al-faqih doctrine.46 Hizbullah’s hierarchal structure 
accommodates consensus, control and flexibility in choosing what type of action is 
required whether it be militant, political, or both for a given situation.47 The secrecy 
behind Hizbullah makes it difficult to gain a clear understanding of its intricate workings 
however, Ahmad Hamzeh and Judith Palmer Harik extensively studied the movement 
and their research forms the basis for my research in applying a social movement theory 






                                                 
43 Hamzeh, 27. 
44 Ibid., 27-28. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 78. 
47 Ibid., 79. 
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C. HIZBULLAH - SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND IDEOLOGY FRAMING 
1.  Hizbullah - Political Opportunity 
 From inception, Hizbullah was a political social movement. Its rationale for 
violence was politically motivated.48 This is different from other Islamic movements 
calling people to return to a stricter form of Islam and individual piety. Instead of turning 
inward, Hizbullah emphasized outward political action. Its initial political objective was 
to remove Israeli troops from Lebanon. According to Hamzeh, observers, analysts, and 
Lebanese in general tend to “regard Hizbullah as a conventional political party or a group 
turned from a terrorist movement into a political party.”49 Hizbullah defines itself as both 
a “struggle movement of faithful Lebanese who believe in Islam, resistance, and 
liberation of the land” and a prominent political party representing mostly Shi’ites in 
Lebanon.50 Hizbullah members currently hold 12 of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament 
but its opportunity to participate within the political system took time.  
 Islamic activism literature suggests societal divisions within Lebanon motivated 
the Shi’ites to mobilize.51 Shi’ites experienced a lower standard of living in Lebanon 
compared to other societal groups which led to their desire to become more politically 
active.52 Lack of government services provided an opportunity for Hizbullah to fill the 
void and establish a significant presence in many areas including districts of Beirut.53 
Even today, Hizbullah continues to provide medical clinics and other services when the 
government can not or will not. This allows Hizbullah to maintain, as well as expand, its 
membership and support base. 
 Hizbullah over the last few decades has taken advantage of opportunities to 
participate in Lebanon’s political system. Older research indicated Hizbullah’s 
participation in government was to establish an “Iranian-style Islamic state in Lebanon 
and that all its actions are instrumental to this ultimate goal.” This notion is short-sided 
                                                 
48 Martin Kramer, “Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad,” www.martinkramer.org (accessed 15 February 
2006), 11. 
49 Hamzeh, 44. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 40,     




and limits the ability to fully understand Hizbullah’s transformation over time.54 Its 1985 
manifesto or ‘open letter’ “called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and 
rejected participation in Lebanon’s confessional system.”55 Establishing an Islamic state 
may no longer be an immediate goal. Hizbullah’s leadership “still contends that an 
Islamic state is a goal that deserves to be aspired to when conditions allow and depending 
on the emergence of a consensus on its desirability.”56 Since Hizbullah began 
participating in Lebanon’s post-civil war politics, the organization has not included 
establishing an Islamic state in its campaign platform. In addition, members elected to 
parliament or local government have not sponsored legislation calling for an Islamic 
state.57 
 In addition to participating in governance, Hizbullah began a public relations 
campaign to modify its image. Hizbullah has gone to great efforts to throw off the label 
of terrorist organization that the United States and its allies have placed on it. Following 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, Hizbullah denied connections with Al-Qaeda and openly 
condemned the group’s actions. Hizbullah further denied involvement in running 
Palestinian terrorist training camps and sending members to support the insurgency in 
Iraq. Harb and Leenders suggest, Hizbullah’s actions indicate a sense of pressure or 
concern that a potential danger exists in being included in the United States’ war on 
terrorism.58  
 While these actions generate cautious optimism in the West, Hizbullah has made 
it clear that it has not given up the fight for what it believes in. Avoiding the terrorist 
label, may constrain or limit its ability to freely take action as it sees fit. While distancing 
itself from Al-Qaeda, it took the opportunity to remind the world it is alive and well. For 
example, in May 2004 during the United States’ military operations in Najaf, Iraq, 
Hizbullah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah told thousands of protestors in Beirut 
that “Hizbullah’s battle against Israeli occupation and Iraqis resisting the United States 
                                                 
54 Harb and Leenders, 179. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Harb and Leenders, 179. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 180 
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occupation were intrinsically linked and part of the larger battle against United States and 
Israeli designs for the region.”59  
2.  Hizbullah - Mobilization 
 Tied closely with political opportunity is the ability for a movement to mobilize. 
Movements need resources and a community to promote its ideology and show support 
for its activities. A community provides participants, funds, and other resources for the 
movement to succeed. Movements can also benefit from a preexisting institutional base 
like a government regime or religious institution. These institutions provide shelter, space 
to operate, and material supplies. At a minimum, they need space to operate freely in civil 
society. Hizbullah’s ability to establish clinics to meet the societal needs is an example. 
Mobilization also encompasses the actions which a movement undertakes, like suicide 
bombing, and the mechanisms to sustain and support the movement. 
 Following the civil war, Syrian occupation and control of Lebanon allowed 
Hizbullah to remain a significant deterrent force in the established security zone. Syrian 
interest in the region included the ability to deter Israeli aggression. Hizbullah effectively 
served that purpose. Hizbullah continued as a resistance force while taking on a more 
political role to address Shi’ite issues.   
 A key aspect of maintaining the ability to mobilize is to conduct ongoing 
recruitment. There are two ways in which individuals can become a member of Hizbullah 
- horizontal or vertical method.60 The vertical method is to enter through the party’s 
regional reinforcement and recruiting section. This is a two stage transformation process 
before becoming a full fledged party member. The first stage, reinforcement (ta’bia) is a 
year long program in which new recruits are taught Hizbullah’s ideology and culture. 
Specifically, it prepares members to follow the Islamic text as interpreted by Hizbullah’s 
marji’yyah (religious authority). In addition, recruits learn to accept the commands of the 
party’s leadership and the potential for martyrdom. New recruits must demonstrate 
commitment, endurance, and loyalty to the party. Final acceptance is determined by the 
party’s security section which keeps a record of all members before and after joining. 
                                                 
59 Harb and Leenders, 180. 
60 Hamzeh, 75-76. 
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 Once a member is approved by the security section they may proceed to stage 
two. Stage two of the vertical method is called intizam (ordered discipline). This stage is 
also a year long process learning the party’s discipline. Members are assigned tasks and 
undergo physical and military training. This stage will determine individual strengths and 
what role or position the individual will be selected for. Those with exceptional military 
abilities will be fighters others will be assigned to political and security units within the 
party. 
 The alternative and exceptional means of joining is the horizontal method. This 
method allows for direct recruitment and assignment of members, with specialized skills, 
into the party’s intermediate level. A member who enters by this path must also 
demonstrate religious faith and support for Hizbullah’s cause. This demonstration of faith 
is confirmed by a letter of recommendation from a Hizbullah cleric or other ulama based 
on trust. Few individuals enter by this path and they must also be approved by the 
security section before becoming members. Once approved these members are assigned 
to an Executive Council division (i.e. social, political, financial, or education division). 
Members, who join via the horizontal method, include medical doctors, engineers, 
university professors, and graduate students who specialize in computers or media for 
example. 
 Another form of “membership” comes at a much lower risk. This type of 
mobilized support for Hizbullah is called al-Tayyar al-Islami (Islamic Current). The 
Islamic Current is the group of supporters that, while not official members, share many of 
the “ideas and activities of Hizbullah.”61 The Islamic Current includes Shi’ite 
constituents and a number of Sunni Islamist groups and movements.62 Groups include 
Hamas, Jihad of Palestine, and the Islamic Association of Lebanon. 
 The Islamic Current also consists of a number of umbrella organizations including 
the Assembly of Muslim Clergy, a Sunni and Shi’ite clergy coalition to bridge 
differences in jurisprudence, and the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, a group of Islamists 
and non-Islamists, whose interest is in fighting Israel. Hizbullah maintains a separation 
between its internal Islamic Resistance fighters and the Lebanese Resistance Brigades. 
                                                 
61 Hamzeh, 77. 
62 Ibid., 78. 
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Being a fighter in the brigades does not make one a fighter in the Hizbullah internal unit. 
Hamzeh explains “the separation was intended to prevent any penetration of the Islamic 
Resistance through membership in the brigades.”63 
 As we see in other Islamic groups, membership can have various levels and risks. 
For those members who are skilled, committed and willing to die for the cause of 
Hizbullah, the opportunity to excel to the status of fighter is a possibility. For others who 
wish to participate within the organization at the political or societal level that is also a 
possibility. The Islamic Current requires the least commitment and offers the lowest risk 
option. 
 Hizbullah’s organizational structure combines “religious, political, and militaristic 
units and mechanisms” to mobilize its base of support.64 In May 2003, Harb and 
Leenders interviewed members of Hizbullah who admitted the “party was lying low.”65 
The events of September 11, 2001 may have in fact helped Hizbullah gain political 
ground and strengthen its membership. Harb and Leenders suggest the United States’ 
labeling Hizbullah as a terrorist organization further promoted Hizbullah’s identity as a 
resistance movement. The attacks allowed Hizbullah to criticize the actions of Al-Qaeda 
while at the same time reinforce its goals of improving Shi’ite conditions in Lebanon and 
removing Israeli occupation in Palestine. 
In effect, Hizbullah can continue to mobilize its supporters and take actions 
within certain bounds to prevent immediate retaliation from the United States or its 
allies.66 Hizbullah seems to support Wickham’s second theory of mobilization which 
suggests movements gain support by focusing on deeply held commitments, values, and 
beliefs as opposed to narrow self-interest.67 
3.  Hizbullah - Framing 
A way to maintain support is through framing organizational goals in a manner 
that resonates with its constituents. Framing plays a key role in any social movement. For 
                                                 
63 Hamzeh, 78. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Harb and Leenders, 177. 
66 Ibid., 180. 
67 Wickham, 232. 
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Hizbullah framing may be the most vital aspect of its activities to sustain momentum and 
membership. Two individuals are responsible for much of Hizbullah’s ability to frame its 
message in a way that resonates with its constituents and the global Muslim community. 
The first individual is Shi’ite cleric Ayatollah Seyyed Fadlallah, Hizbullah’s “Spiritual 
Guide”, and the second is Hizbullah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.68  
 Judith Palmer Harik suggests Ayatollah Fadlallah has a natural ability to present 
Hizbullah’s position and goals in a way that all Lebanese, Muslims and Christians, can 
understand and support.69 For example, after the 1983 suicide attack against American 
and French forces in Beirut, Fadlallah justified the acts as a defensive action in 
accordance with religious legal measures for the sole purpose of removing foreign 
occupiers. 
 Hizbullah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah is also a skilled speaker and 
politician. His skills are demonstrated through his ability to frame an issue to 
accommodate a specific target audience. Harik presents an example of how Nasrallah 
frames jihad against Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. When speaking to a gathering 
of Shi’ites, Nasrallah presents jihad in a purely religious context. Jihad is presented as a 
sacred religious duty that must be put above all else with the goal being to liberate all 
Muslim lands including the holy city of Jerusalem. A nationalistic frame is used when 
addressing a wider Lebanese audience of mixed faith, Nasrallah presents jihad as a 
“patriotic duty to liberate the homeland and drive the Israelis out of Lebanon.” By using 
this frame Hizbullah represents the Lebanese people. Hizbullah draws on nationalistic 
feelings and makes the battle a national responsibility to resist Israeli occupation not only 
of Lebanon, which ended in 2000, but also the on-going occupation of Palestinian land.70 
 A third frame of reference is used when the target audience is more responsive to 
an Arab nationalist context. Nasrallah by presenting an issue in this manner expands the 
base of support to all Arabs. The “struggle against Israel is promoted with reference to 
the harmful inroads of the West in the region as an effort to stand up to and defeat 
America’s imperialistic designs.” According to Harik, this frame portrays Israel as the 
                                                 
68 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism, London, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2005, 
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70 Ibid., 71. 
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“American lackey or agent that must be resisted by the spearhead of the Arab nation—
Hizbullah.” A final example of Nasrallah’s skill in framing jihad is when he addresses an 
international audience. Through the global reach of Hizbullah’s international television 
channel, al-Manar, he presents the Israeli occupation as an international issue. Nasrallah 
frames jihad as a “recognized right enjoyed by all people whose countries are illegally 
occupied” and declares Israelis as “violators of international accords.”71 
 Hizbullah’s “mission and identity are rooted in its founders’ belief that the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanese territory in the 1980s ought to be beaten by armed resistance. Even 
following the low-intensity war in the 1990s and the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 
May 2000, the notion of resistance has remained central to Hizbullah’s self proclaimed 
mission.”72 While many of Hizbullah’s goals are against Israel, alternative goals are to 
improve conditions for Shi’ites in Lebanon and resist Western influence.  
 Hizbullah has used oppression as a central element to frame the Muslim 
experience under Western influence.73 “Colonialism and imperialism are singled out as 
the major constants of how countries like France, Britain, and more recently, the United 
States have trampled on the Muslims” and approached them with “contempt, double 
standards and brutal force in order to impose their hegemony.”74 According to the party’s 
ideologues, battles over subjugation have been reinforced by a clash between Islamic and 
Western civilization.75 The West, America in particular, can be framed as the 
embodiment of evil and injustice for supporting Israelis over Palestinians, launching 
attacks that killed civilians in Afghanistan, and the recent invasion of Iraq. 
 Hizbullah’s frames are rooted in an ideology that promises Islamic order and 
creates a just society that cannot be achieved through secular Western forms of 
government and development. “Accordingly, Hizbullah leaders such as Nasrallah, Qasim, 
Yazbak, and others tell Muslims, ‘Only God’s just society aims at social justice’.”76 
Shi’ite practice of “ijtihad (authoritative interpretation of Islamic law) provides not only a 
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potential source for Islamic legislation but flexibility in the face of changing political 
circumstances.”77 
 Hizbullah’s ability to adapt its framing over the past two decades produce sets of 
meanings embedded in a religious and political framework.78 Having a religious and 
political framework founded in wilayat al-faqih allows its leadership to elaborate, mold, 
and alter the party’s ideological components—establishing Islamic order, waging jihad, 
fostering Islamic unity, and creating social justice.79 Hizbullah’s ability to skillfully 
frame its position adds to the difficulty of determining if its primary intent is to become 
less violent. 
 Hizbullah appears to have mastered the art of framing in order to maintain 
organizational support and play a strategic role in the Lebanese political system. At one 
extreme Hizbullah states: “‘Our slogan is and remains death to America’, Hizbullah’s 
secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah told to a cheering crowd of supporters in a Beirut 
suburb in April 2003.”80 In another situation, Hizbullah blamed “Egyptian Islamists for 
launching an armed campaign against the Egyptian state without having exhausted the 
route of dialogue and reconciliation, while diverting resources away from what it sees as 
the real and legitimate struggle against Israel.”81 Hizbullah’s ability to target the right 
audience with the right message may to some extent provide it greater influence and 
support domestically and across the Muslim world to further its goals. 
D. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND REFORMS 
Hizbullah has been taken seriously by the Lebanese population which supports 
the party not only with their funds but also their votes, electing them to positions of 
political power. The Lebanese government is based on a confessional or proportional 
representation system that dates back to a 1932 census. The confessional system ensures, 
at the national level, that the President will be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister 
will be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament will be a Shi’ite Muslim. This 
system of government, though not perfect, seems to endure. During the long civil war no 
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group called for complete abandonment of the confessional system. Instead the call was 
for reform and greater representation reflecting current Lebanese demographics. 
 It took a civil war and the Taif Accord to revise the Maronite-favored system of 
government. Taif Accord or, Document of National Understanding, was an effort to 
rebuild Lebanon’s political system in the post-civil war period and provide better 
representation among sectarian groups. Sixty-two parliamentary members, elected in 
1972, met in Taif, Saudi Arabia from September 30 until October 22, 1989. These 
individuals represented legitimately elected officials and were accepted as the best group 
to represent the Lebanese concerns and develop a reformed political system. 
 The Taif Accord called for the long term goal of abolishing the confessional 
system. This however would not be achievable in the short term. The main provisions of 
the Taif Accord redistributed parliamentary representation equally between Christians 
and Muslims. The old parliamentary distribution favored Christians by a 6:5 ratio. Two 
other provisions affected the power balance between the President, Prime Minister, and 
Speaker of Parliament. The Sunni Prime Minister and cabinet gained significant power as 
some responsibilities shifted away from the Christian President. The Shi’ite Speaker of 
Parliament also gained greater power via expanded responsibilities. Recommendations 
from the Taif Accord also led to a revised constitution which was approved in 1990. The 
Prime Minister is no longer chosen directly by the President but now by the President and 
parliament in the presence of the Speaker of Parliament. In addition to the Taif Accord, 
an electoral law to improve representation was passed in 1992 increasing the number of 
parliamentary seats from 99 to 128.82  
 The 1992 elections were a defining moment for Lebanon. These elections would 
be the first in twenty years and the first to be held under the new constitution. The 128 
seats were divided equally between Christians and Muslims. The Christian block was 
made up of Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian 
Catholics, Anglicans, and Others. The Muslim block was made up of Shi’ites, Sunnis, 
Druze, and Alawites.  
 An electoral law in 2000, supported by Syria who still occupied Lebanon, divided 
Lebanon into 14 constituencies and crossed sectarian boundaries. As a result, the groups                                                  
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which supported Syria, primarily Hizbullah, Amal, and the Druze, benefited the most.83 
Even with new electoral laws and a revised constitution, the 15 years of civil war 
followed by 15 years of Syrian control did not fundamentally change the structure of 
Lebanon’s confessional system of government.84 
E. HIZBULLAH: EXTREMISM, MODERATION AND POLITICAL GAIN 
1.  Political Gain 
Hizbullah has competed in three parliamentary elections since 1992, winning at 
least ten percent of the seats. As a political party, for the last 15 years, it has effectively 
sought to democratize the national political system. In the mid-1990s, Hizbullah pushed 
for local government reform calling for democratic governance at the municipal level. 
Municipal elections had not been held since 1963. When local elections were held in 
1998, Hizbullah gained 15 percent of the contested municipalities. During 2004 elections 
Hizbullah gained control of 21 percent of the municipalities.85 Hizbullah has done very 
well in municipal and parliamentary elections but, refused to seek ministerial positions 
until 2005. Prior to 2005, the rationale for avoiding ministerial positions was to maintain 
a separation from the internal government structure in order to maintain a sense of loyalty 
to its constituents.  
2.  Hizbullah Support 
In addition to political gain, Hizbullah provides for the greater good of Lebanese 
through its social programs. While it emerged out of conflict and is most widely known 
for forcing IDF troops to withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hizbullah’s greatest 
achievement may be in providing social services. Its ability to provide social services 
gained both loyalty and support from Muslims and Christians in war torn southern 
Lebanon. Within three years of its formation it provided trash-removal service to the 
areas it controlled. This was five years before the Lebanese government could achieve the 
same task. Hizbullah was not limited to trash-removal it also provided schools, hospitals, 
public health services, aid for rural-development, low-income housing assistance, small 
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loans to businesses, and monetary aid to those in need. Hizbullah demonstrated its ability 
to provide for people’s needs when the Lebanese government was unable. As the 
Lebanese government improves its ability to meet societal needs, Hizbullah remains a 
significant service provider.86 
 Hizbullah social-service organizations provide assistance to all Lebanese who 
need help whether Muslim or Christian. Judith Palmer Harik, in her research, found that 
many Christian families send their children to Hizbullah run schools in areas of southern 
Lebanon. The rationale being Hizbullah provides the best education available. Harik 
credits Hizbullah’s success in the political arena to its success in providing social services 
for the greater good of many Lebanese regardless of belief.87  
3.  Obstacles to Democracy 
While Hizbullah has sustained a successful political record, the fact remains that 
it retains its militant wing and has declared at times its willingness to use all means 
necessary when and if required. On multiple occasions, Hizbullah has stated its position 
with regards to Israel, the United States and the West in general. Hizbullah’s 1985 “Open 
letter” clearly declared its enemies which included: Israel, France, and the United States. 
It called for the expulsion of French and American troops from Lebanon which occurred. 
It also called for the “obliteration” of the state of Israel.88 Though Hizbullah seems to 
have moderated its goals on these matters has not officially changed. 
In March 2004, Nasrallah again spoke of his feelings, and presumably those of 
Hizbullah, when discussing Israel and the United States. “Regarding the United States, 
Nasrallah referred to the ‘Satanism of this administration’… America is proving 
everyday, not only in Iraq, but again in Palestine and through its veto that it is covering 
up for the killing, terrorism and crime; rather it is a complete partner in the killing, 
terrorism and crime.” Regarding Israel he referred to them as a “monstrous, terrorist and 
cancerous entity.” 89 
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While maintaining a hard-line stance against Israel and the United States, 
Hizbullah has indicated a willingness to disarm its militant wing if and when the 
Lebanese government is strong enough to defend against Israel and other potential 
external threats. Another factor may be the removal of Israeli forces from the contested 
Shebaa farms region. Ownership of the small area of land is disputed between Lebanon, 
Syria, and Israel. As long as Israeli forces occupy the area Hizbullah can justify the need 
to remain armed.90 Hizbullah’s reputation for armed resistance, as the only group to 
successfully defeat the IDF, may make it difficult to moderate and fully disarm. 
Disarming may appear as a sign of weakness or caving to United States and Western 
influence. The United States and Israel may have to make a significant effort to reach a 
lasting peace agreement. Current United States policy and recent Israeli actions to 
eliminate Hizbullah may have only strengthened support for Hizbullah within Lebanon 
and across the Middle East. These actions are counter productive and delay the prospects 
for a strong democratic Lebanon which could be the role model for the region. 
Hizbullah’s actions, rhetoric and political choices can be seen as an attempt to 
maintain the largest support base possible. Hizbullah is able to use its ideological frames: 
Islamism, Lebanese nationalism, Arab nationalism, and global anti-Imperialism to 
maintain support within and outside of Lebanon. “Thus far, inside Lebanon, they seem to 
have softened, or deferred until later, their desire for a completely Islamic government. 
Indeed, party leaders have always stressed that they do not seek to force either Islam or 
Islamic government on anyone; they simply ‘invite’ Christians in Lebanon and elsewhere 
to be open to hearing the Islamic call.”91 Hizbullah’s face to the external world, in light 
of the recent Israeli conflict, calls for the return to militancy and a renewed hard-line 
stance. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Hizbullah has clearly demonstrated its willingness to participate in Lebanon’s 
political structure. Hizbullah is likely to continue promoting democratic reform and 
improving social welfare not only for Shi’ites but all Lebanese. The willingness to disarm 
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and forego violence as a means to defend and advance its goals is unlikely as long as 
Israel is perceived as a threat to Lebanon and occupier of Palestinian land. The 2006 
conflict between IDF and Hizbullah militia forces in southern Lebanon reinforced 
Hizbullah’s belief in the need to remain armed and ready to defend against external 
threats. On September 22, 2006, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasralleh addressed a million 
plus Lebanese gathering in a southern Beirut suburb. His message called for strong 
Lebanese unity and the need to rid Lebanon of corruption. Most surprising Nasralleh 
addressed the issue of disarming Hizbullah. He offered that when the state is strong 
enough to protect Lebanon then Hizbullah will disarm.92 The United States and the 
international community continue to pressure the Lebanese government to force 
Hizbullah to disarm. A way to promote disarmament may be to help Lebanon develop a 
stronger government able to control its own territory. The more likely option is to remove 
the perceived security threat posed by Israel. Israel must be willing to remove forces from 
the Shebaa farms region in conjunction with renewed efforts for peace with Lebanon and 
Syria. Hizbullah’s participation in municipal and parliamentary elections combined with 
its controlled actions set an example for other Islamist groups around the world. Its 
actions should also capture the attention of the United States and other Western countries 
which have an interest in spreading democracy and eliminating radical Islamist elements 
in the region. 
Social movements can either avoid or adapt to take advantage of changes within a 
political environment. Hizbullah has already become instrumental in providing social 
services. Hizbullah’s participation in the political system would lead to further 
institutionalization and it becoming fully integrated into the Lebanese system. The final 
step for Hizbullah, who considers extreme violence part of its repertoire, is to completely 
forego violence becoming a legitimate political party in the eyes of the international 
community.   
For now, Hizbullah may remain one of the most feared Islamic activist groups 
even though signs of moderation are present. Hizbullah presents a complex situation for 
                                                 
92 Nir Rosen, “Realities about Hizbullah, the Party of God,” The Defense Association for Lebanon and 
Palestine Islamic Resistance Movement, http://www.moqavemat.ir/?lang=en&state 
=showbody_news&row_id=3603 (accessed October 2006). 
32 
Lebanon and the rest of the world. The key to Hizbullah becoming less violent and 
transitioning to a political party is disarmament.93 Julia Choucair recommends the United 
States “adopt a low-profile approach, re-emphasizing that the issue of Hizbullah’s final 
status is to be resolved by the Lebanese.”94 The big issue that fuels conflict in the region 
continues to be the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Until a peaceful solution is reached, it 
appears Hizbullah will remain unwilling to disarm. Prior transformation of the group 
indicates that moderation absent Israeli conflict is a real possibility. The 2006 conflict 
with Israeli forces may have turned back progress and reaffirmed the need for a strong 
militant wing to protect its interests and the people of southern Lebanon. 
Hizbullah offers a flexible level of commitment that aids in its recruitment and 
retention of members. Hizbullah’s mastery of framing maintains organizational support 
and promotes its political strategy. Hizbullah’s frames are rooted in an ideology that 
promises an Islamic order and social justice that continues to resonate among its support 
base. 
Hizbullah may disarm and adopt peaceful means but it will be a gradual transition 
based on a timeline it determines. Most Lebanese consider Hizbullah a valid 
organization, “as they credit it with pushing Israel out of Lebanon.”95 For that same 
reason the Arab world recognizes their significance. Ahmad Hamzeh offers a less 
optimistic opinion:  “Hizbullah’s operational choices--militancy and gradualist-pragmatic 
modes--sanctioned by its ideology as armed and unarmed struggle--give the party a 
choice to act according to the circumstances.” This is why Hizbullah has fluctuated 
between militancy and political gradualism. Hizbullah in essence has transformed itself 
into a political movement working from within the system, advocating the causes of 
underdogs in Lebanese society. Hizbullah has succeeded so far in capitalizing on its role 
in the ‘victory’ over the Israeli forces.”96 Overall, it may be too early to tell if Hizbullah 
will disarm and rely only on democratic participation. 
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III. EGYPT AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Since its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has remained dedicated to 
social welfare and civil society activism. For a brief period the Brotherhood pursued 
violent methods only to return to non-violent means. The group’s institutionalization 
within Egyptian society has pushed the Brotherhood to participate in Egypt’s political 
system. Advocating democracy and taking advantage of political opportunities allow the 
Brotherhood to advance its goals in an otherwise repressive authoritarian regime.97 In 
doing so, the Brotherhood has promoted deeper democratic reforms. In addition, 
participation combined with moderation allows the Brotherhood to draw support from 
moderate Muslim constituents. 
B. RISE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
 The Society of Muslim Brothers or Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan 
al-Banna, a schoolteacher, along with a small group of Egyptian laborers in the Suez 
Canal city of Isma‘iliya in 1928. Al-Banna became a leading ideologue of Islamic 
Fundamentalism. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged during the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and the rise of secular nationalism. The founding focus was to reestablish Islam’s 
role in influencing state governance, which existed previously in the position of the 
caliph (leader) following the death of the prophet Mohammad.98 Like other groups the 
goal was to return to the core principles of the Quran and establish Islamic social order. 
The Brotherhood represented a social movement focused less on religion and individual 
piety and more on the union of Islam and modernity to create a modern Islamic society. 
The Brotherhood’s vision was to create a complete seamless Islamic environment which 
blended society, state, culture, and religion.99 A general belief underlying 
fundamentalism and Islamism is that politics and religion were one during the time of the 
Prophet and should remain that way in modern times. In addition, the Brotherhood did 
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not rule out the belief that violence or jihad (Holy War) against an illegitimate regime 
may be necessary to establish true Islamic order. 
 During the early years, the Brotherhood remained relatively small and focused on 
building local membership. Al-Banna relocated the Brotherhood’s core members to Cairo 
in order to expand membership and merge with another Islamic group run by al-Banna’s 
brother.100 During its first years in Cairo, the group published weekly newsletters, held a 
general conference, and continued to expand membership. By 1938, estimated 
membership was between 50,000 and 150,000 members. The Brotherhood remained 
focused on recruitment, mutual aid and building a social service organization. By the late 
1930s, an internal shift took place and the organization became more involved in political 
activism. An Arab general strike in Palestine became the catalyst for political transition. 
The Society generated Egyptian public sympathy and collected funds to support the strike 
effort. Brotherhood newsletters were critical of the existing political regime and focused 
negatively on existing elements of British colonial control and influence.101  
 In 1941, the Brotherhood took a bold step entering the political arena putting forth 
candidates for parliamentary election. The Brotherhood sponsored large public rallies, 
held demonstrations to protest the presence of British troops and called for social reforms 
in Egypt. British authorities ordered al-Banna to leave Cairo in May 1941. In October, al-
Banna and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders were imprisoned. In 1942, Brotherhood 
meetings were banned after hosting a public rally to denounce the British war effort. 
Shortly thereafter, the government became less concerned about Muslim reformers and 
more concerned about the Second World War The government released Brotherhood 
leaders, allowed meetings to continue, and membership to grow.102 
 During this period, the group had over two thousand branches and between 
300,000 and 600,000 active members—the largest organized force in Egypt. In addition 
to membership expansion, the Brotherhood increased publications and public 
demonstrations, and adopted a more militant side. The Brotherhood created an internal 
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paramilitary group, known as the Secret Apparatus, to protect its leadership and conduct 
violent political acts to advance organizational goals.103  
 Following the Second World War, the Muslim Brotherhood played a central role 
in the rise of popular unrest in Egypt. In 1947, the government and Egyptian police 
discovered the organization had a large arms cache stored outside Cairo. In 1948, the 
government officially outlawed the Brotherhood and many of its members were 
imprisoned after police confiscated a jeep filled with explosives. In retaliation, 
Brotherhood members assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-
Nuqrashi. The Brotherhood’s leader Hasan al-Banna was murdered two months later, 
allegedly by Egyptian police. 104 
 Following al-Banna’s death, Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi, a former Egyptian High 
court judge, became the Brotherhood’s next leader. Al-Hudaybi kept the organization 
together during a period of government repression including the imprisonment of many 
of its members. The number of arrest exceeded four thousand.105 The organization also 
suffered internal leadership struggles as well as external pressures.  
 On July 23, 1952, the government was overthrown by a military coup led by a 
group of military officers calling themselves the Free Officers. Gamal Nasser emerged as 
the leader of the Free Officers. According to Munson, the Free Officers had strong ties to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. With Gamal Nasser coming to power, the political environment 
improved for the Brotherhood. Once in power, Nasser released imprisoned members and 
allowed the Brotherhood to resume activities. The cordial relationship was short lived 
and Nasser suppressed Islamist ideology in favor of nationalism.106 Tension increased to 
the point that on October 27, 1954 a Muslim Brotherhood member attempted to 
assassinate Nasser during a public speech. In response, Nasser ordered over a thousand 
members arrested and the Society disbanded for a second time. The crackdown resulted 
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in the execution of six Brotherhood leaders and many hundreds more tortured and 
imprisoned.107 
 By 1970, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the Egyptian government 
would again swing in favor of the Brotherhood. President Anwar Sadat looked to the 
Brotherhood to serve as a balancer against pro-Nasserist groups which could form an 
opposition to his government.108 During the Sadat era, the Brotherhood focused on 
rebuilding its membership and adopted a moderate stance becoming an organization 
committed to nonviolence and active participation in Egyptian politics.109 Internal 
conflict within the Brotherhood caused radical militant members to splinter off and form 
new organizations. One such group, al-Jihad, was formed in 1979 by Muhammad Abd al-
Salam Faraj. A member of al-Jihad later assassinated Sadat during a military parade in 
1981. 
 Following Sadat’s assassination, the Brotherhood took steps to distance itself 
from more militant Islamist groups. Sadat’s death brought Vice President Hosni Mubarak 
to power. Mubarak immediately took steps to control the Islamists and had a number of 
radical Islamists arrested.110 By 1984, President Mubarak began to loosen his grip on 
Islamists. He allowed some political opportunity via controlled parliamentary election 
which, in turn, allowed a few Brotherhood members, campaigning as independents, to 
gain deputy positions. In addition to Mubarak’s electoral concessions, most Islamic 
militants arrested in 1981 were released from prison.111  
Since the Sadat era, the Brotherhood continues to be a nonviolent Islamist 
movement indirectly participating in Egyptian politics. While the state does not recognize 
the Brotherhood as a legal political party, members have been elected into parliament. 
The Brotherhood’s greatest strength may remain its ability to create change by 
influencing Egypt’s Muslim population. 
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C. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD – SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND 
IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING 
1.  Muslim Brotherhood Ideology 
 The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a grassroots response to government 
repression and a crisis of modernity. Egypt was facing the challenges of colonialism, 
economic and cultural dependence, rapid industrialization and urbanization, a massive 
population explosion, and the need for improved social welfare.112 The Brotherhood 
called for a return to the fundamentals of Islam as the basis of Muslim social and political 
renewal.113 Muslim Brotherhood ideology is based on the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam, 
one of the four main schools for Islamic understanding and interpretation of Islamic law. 
This school of law insists on a literal reading of the Quran and other texts. The Quran is 
believed to provide the universal moral principles for all actions. The Brotherhood’s 
initial focus was centered on opposing foreign influence and control, poverty, and the 
moral decline of state and society in Egypt.114 Brotherhood ideology emphasized the 
need to build a single cohesive community resistant to Western influence and 
corruption.115  
 The Brotherhood called for the creation of an Islamic state and insisted Islam was 
democratic in nature and compatible with modernity. Muslim Brotherhood publications 
called for the state to provide a strong army, build closer ties with Arab nations and 
increase overall social welfare. Increased social welfare included more hospitals and 
clinics, better working conditions for agriculture and industrial workers, to include 
minimum wage, and an increase in government programs to reduce the growing 
unemployment problem.116 
 The Brotherhood was not only concerned with macro issues, it also focused on 
individual Muslims and how they live their daily lives. The Brotherhood believed a 
permissive secular lifestyle led to immorality, poverty, and Western domination. 
According to Munson, the Brotherhood advocated the need for censorship of television, 
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radio and printed material. In addition, all education programs must include Islamic 
history, Arabic language, and Quranic studies. Each individual is responsible to adhere to 
the highest standards of conduct. Acts associated with alcohol, dancing, attending movie 
theaters, foreign styles of dress, prostitution and adultery should be avoided. The 
Brotherhood ideology tied the problems of state and society to the conduct of each 
individual Muslim in Egypt.117  
 The Muslim Brotherhood ideology may have gained the most ground during the 
Sadat era. Unlike Nasser, Sadat relaxed the state’s monopoly on ideology and no longer 
sought to contain or control religion. The unintended consequence of using the 
Brotherhood to balance against pro-Nasserists and leftist movements was that the 
Brotherhood became a powerful force in society. The Brotherhood gained followers in an 
environment of open religious practice but remained constrained by a restrictive political 
arena. The mosque provided uninhibited space and opportunity for free exchange of ideas 
molded within a religious framework to influence individuals and politics.118 
2.  Muslim Brotherhood Mobilization 
 What motivates Muslims to join and why do they stay involved?  Carrie 
Wickham’s research on Islamic activism in Egypt provided an explanation. She found 
that “the presence of Islamist networks at the local level where people lived, studied, and 
worked made them highly accessible and minimized the social distance between 
participants and non-participants.”119 Daily personal contact facilitated the decision to 
join the group.  
 The Sadat era allowed the Brotherhood to sink deep roots into society. During the 
1970s, a significant increase in independent private mosques occurred. The importance of 
this fact is that independent mosques where not controlled by the government. The 
mosques provided a safe meeting point for members, militants, and recruits.120 Sadat’s 
encouragement of Islamism allowed an extensive social network to form. The 
Brotherhood’s network of educational and social services provided opportunities to build 
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and influence a community of supporters. Brotherhood expansion coincided with the 
government’s inability to provide services due to economic constraints, population 
growth, and a large number of unemployed educated youth. All these factors benefited 
the Brotherhood.121 
 Intentionally or unintentionally the “Muslim Brotherhood has spawn many of the 
militant Islamic groups that exist today, including organizations such as Hamas, the 
Islamic Jihad, and Jamaat Islamiyah.”122 Many radical Islamist groups that splintered off 
the Brotherhood were influence by Seyyed Qutb, a Brotherhood member and leading 
ideologue. Seyyed Qutb’s writings and interpretation of Islamic concepts made militant 
acts, such as the violent takeover of government, acceptable. He believed the “duty of 
righteous Muslims was to bring about God’s sovereignty over society, denounce the 
unbelief of the current national leaders, and carry out a holy struggle against them.”123 
A demonstration of the Brotherhood’s ability to mobilize the masses occurred in 
March 2005. Street demonstrations in Cairo and surrounding areas were meant to signal 
disapproval with Mubarak’s electoral reforms. Roughly 1,500 Brotherhood members 
including some leaders were arrested and later released. The protests stopped by the 
summer but the intended message was delivered. The Brotherhood had broken its long 
standing truce to not engage politically against the Mubarak government.124 The 
demonstrations were carefully targeted at policy not President Mubarak. The 
Brotherhood may have been sending a reminder of its capability to influence and 
mobilize a large portion of society. 
3.  Muslim Brotherhood Framing 
 From its beginning the slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood has been “the Quran is 
our constitution.” To its founders, Islam offered “a complete and total system, and there 
was no need to go looking for European values as a basis for social order.”125 As 
mentioned earlier, religion provides a fundamental set of moral standards to mobilize 
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individuals or groups. Muslim Brotherhood success in mobilizing and expanding its 
membership is in the way it frames or presents its Islamic message on a personal level. 
The message is “tied to its organizational structure, activities, and strategies and the 
everyday lives of Egyptians.”126 
 The Brotherhood serves the personal or selective interests of its members through 
its social programs and provides a sense of moral obligation through its Islamic ideology. 
For example, local mosques serve the selected interests of young adults by providing 
religious lessons and study group activities that create a social setting for both men and 
women to interact outside the home.127 The Brotherhood influences its members through 
its social programs and teachings while providing a benefit that encourages participation. 
The participation in higher risk activities like protest demonstrations require a stronger 
framing mechanism. 
 Religion offers the Brotherhood one of the strongest framing mechanisms. By 
framing beliefs and activities in terms of Islam these beliefs and activities take on a moral 
or religious obligation.128 If members do not participate their devotion to Islam and 
fellow Muslims comes under question. This creates conditions in which personal belief 
and commitment make it extremely difficult to resist engaging in organizational activities 
ending in possible imprisonment or death in extreme cases. 
4.  Muslim Brotherhood Political Opportunities in Egypt 
 Political opportunity in the Middle East remains limited. One explanation for 
regimes to limit open election and avoid democracy is the fear of a “one person, one vote, 
one time” scenario bringing Islamists to power.129 “One person, one vote, one time” is 
the belief that Islamists only participate in elections in order to seize power and create a 
theocracy. As a result, Islamists would not allow another open democratic election which 
may result in a non-Islamic group regaining government control.130 The Mubarak regime 
can therefore justify its actions and insist Islamists should not be given party status or 
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allowed to directly compete in elections. In order to contain or control electoral 
participation the electoral system itself is structured or “fixed” to influence election 
outcomes. According to LeVine, factors such as voter and candidate eligibility, drawing 
of electoral districts, the type of electoral system, and the distribution of assembly seats 
can play a part in keeping existing regimes in power while at the same time offering a 
minimal level of political participation.131 
 Even a small opening in the political arena is a “departure from past practices and 
contrast with some neighboring states, where legislatures are either non-existent or 
chosen without contestation.”132 The fact contested elections are held admits citizens 
have a right to determine their political leadership and form of government. During the 
1980s, political reform in Egypt and several other Arab countries created the opportunity 
for multiparty competition. Reforms were constrained or undone in the 1990s, as regimes 
felt their position of power being threatened.133 Regimes became fearful that parties 
would continue to gain political power and push for open elections at the national level. 
In order to prevent this from happening, governments adopted measures to limit 
opposition parties from gaining real political power.134 President Mubarak remains 
unwilling to allow the Brotherhood legal political party status. The Brotherhood’s non-
violent rhetoric may not be enough to provide Mubarak a sense of regime security given 
its violent past during the 1950s.135 
D. EGYPT’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 The political environment in Egypt has been governed by an authoritarian regime 
for most of its history. President Hasni Mubarak, in power since 1981, has allowed 
limited political reforms to take place in order to promote a democratic image to 
Egyptians and the outside world, however, Egypt remains predominantly authoritarian. 
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Mubarak’s primary support base comes from the dominant National Democratic Party 
and the military.  
 Egyptian parliament, established in 1866, stands as the largest and longest 
running parliamentary system in the region. While the parliament remains relatively weak 
in comparison to the executive it has, at times, been a source of opposition to the ruling 
regime.136 The primary actors within the Egyptian system are the President, Prime 
Minister, and the parliament consisting of the Consultative Council (upper house), with 
264 seats, and the People’s Assembly (lower house), with 454 seats. The Consultative 
Council is also referred to as the Shura Council.137  
E. POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORM 
 Egyptian regimes overtime have taken steps to “re-Islamize” their governments.  
They have adopted Islamic rhetoric as a way of marginalizing or co-opting potential 
Islamist opposition while at the same time adding legitimacy to their own authority. For 
example, the Egyptian constitution of 1971 reintroduced religious law as a guiding 
principle by declaring sharia the main source of reference to develop legislation.138 
 In recent years, Mubarak has cautiously taken steps to open or at least provide 
more transparency and honest reform in his government. Opening the political space 
comes at a price. While the 2000 election was perceived as “cleaner than previous 
elections,” the ruling National Democratic Party showed some weakness as party 
dominance fell from 90.4 percent (1995 election) to 87.8 percent.139 The National 
Democratic Party (NDP) initially captured 175 seats while independent candidates gained 
250. In the end, 213 independent candidates joined the NDP re-establishing its control 
over parliament.140 The 2000 election also witnessed an increase in Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates competing as independents. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to gain 17 
seats in the 2000 election. 
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 While 2000 showed some opening in the political space, President Mubarak 
promised to allow a competitive presidential election in 2005. Technically the election 
process was open and competitive however political rules of engagement guaranteed 
Mubarak would retain the presidency.141 Rules of engagement included the requirement 
for unaffiliated candidates to secure the signature of at least 65 members of Egypt’s lower 
house of parliament, 25 from the upper house members, and 10 municipal council 
members. National Democratic Party dominance in all three areas made the task nearly 
impossible to achieve.142  
 The 2005 elections demonstrated a turning point in Egyptian political 
environment. The people demonstrated through the ballot box the desire for change. 
While the presidency was safe, parliamentary elections resulted in 70 percent turnover. 
The NDP still maintains an overwhelming majority however, Muslim Brotherhood 
members competing as independent candidates made a substantial advance in the 
political arena by gaining 88 seats. 
F. MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD:  EXTREMISM, MODERATION AND 
POLITICAL GAIN 
 While Muslim Brotherhood is not an official political party and the Mubarak 
regime continues to constrain the political space, the brotherhood has clearly gained some 
ground. Overall success in Egyptian parliamentary elections has been mixed but is now 
showing a positive trend. The Brotherhood gained 36 of 454 seats (eight percent) in 1987, 
boycotted elections in 1990, gained 1 seat in 1995, 17 seats in 2000 (four percent), and 88 
seats (nineteen percent) in 2005. It seems like the Brotherhood has put away violence to 
promoted social welfare, education, and political participation. Grassroots involvement 
allows the Brotherhood to build social networks to influence the population and create a 
community of supporters.143 
 The Brotherhood in Egypt also appears to be what scholars are calling a 
mainstream Islamic movement. Mainstream Islamist movements can be defined as 
having strictly “renounced violence and are pursuing their goals through peaceful 
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political activity.”144 There exists, however, division within the Brotherhood. The 
division is between old guard hard-liners and younger middle generation members. The 
old guard grew up in the Brotherhood during the repressive Nasser era while the middle 
generation experienced greater freedom under Sadat. The old guard is more conservative 
seeking to preserve the movement’s missionary focus. The middle generation is more 
open to change and focused on political opportunity. Middle generation leaders seek to 
form an open political party. Middle generation leaders have also accused the old guard 
hard-liners of colluding with the Mubarak regime to maintain status quo restricting 
further democratic reform.145 The middle generation has chosen to remain loyal to 
Brotherhood and not splinter off and join forces with Egypt’s reformist al-Wasat Party. 
The al-Wasat party, to some extent, promotes a “believing secularism” ideology.146 The 
difference of opinion within Brotherhood ranks may not be enough to cause a breakup, 
but it emphasizes the fact that true democracy will not be possible without promoting an 
open political system. Islamist parties are the only non-governmental organizations which 
have the capacity to form an alternative to ruling regimes. If Islamist parties are not 
allowed to participate in an open political environment any form of democracy is near 
impossible to achieve.147 
Regime backlash, in addition to political rules of engagement, may also be an 
obstacle to political gain for the Muslim Brotherhood. Human Rights Watch reported that 
792 Muslim Brotherhood members were detained between March and mid-October 2006. 
The article stated, Muslim Brotherhood lawyers confirmed that 62 members remain in 
custody (as of 18 October). Detainees include 33 held “without charge under provisions 
of Egypt’s Emergency Law, which allows the government to indefinitely detain people 
without charge, trial or legal recourse.” The remaining 29 were charged with “belonging 
to an illegal organization.” Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights 
Watch is also quoted as saying, “Once again, the Egyptian authorities are relying on 
illegitimate laws to imprison members of the political opposition…[d]ay after day, month 
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after month, the government tramples on the rights of Egyptian citizens to ensure that it 
maintains its monopoly on power.”148 
G. CONCLUSION 
 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt went through a stage of using violence but 
returned to non-violence. Radical factions advocating violence have emerged from 
within, but the Brotherhood itself has remained non-violent since the 1950s. Those 
factions split from the parent organization and pursued their own path. Since 1981, the 
Brotherhood distanced itself from more violent groups. In doing so, the group heeded its 
own interests in the political arena and its priority of social welfare and civil society 
activism. The Brotherhood has maintained its position on non-violence and continues to 
pressure the Mubarak regime for political reform. The Muslim Brotherhood’s willingness 
to participate in Egypt’s political process, indirectly if necessary, suggest there is an 
opportunity to become institutionalized into the state political system versus being seen 
merely as an opposition force to the current regime.  
 The Mubarak regime clearly has the upper hand in designing the electoral rule set. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity and ability to be elected should send a clear signal 
to the regime that the potential for political unrest may be looming on the horizon. 
Continued political exclusion forces the Brotherhood to continue grassroots efforts to 
influence the masses. The Muslim Brotherhood remains aware of the volatility of the 
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IV. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND HAMAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On January 25, 2006, Palestinians went to the ballot box and cast their votes in 
favor of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Harakat al-Muqawima al-Islamiyya, 
commonly referred to as Hamas. The Palestinians sent a clear signal to Fatah controlled 
Palestinian Authority (PA): the time for change is now. Hamas gained 74 of 132 seats, in 
a free and open election, giving them controlling majority. Four Hamas members 
competing as independent candidates also gained seats in the election. It seems 
Palestinians lost faith in the “negotiation for peace” program that began with Yasser 
Arafat and continued under PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Attempts over the last forty 
years to achieve lasting peace yielded little more than brief periods of reduced violence. 
Hamas’ political achievement significantly transformed the political landscape, breaking 
Fatah’s single-party dominance and setting the course for more democratic governance to 
emerge. 
B. RISE OF HAMAS 
 The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) formed in 1987 as an outgrowth of 
the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’ founders were Brotherhood members and 
the organization remains closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood network. The first 
Palestinian intifada (uprising) against Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory served as 
the trigger mechanism for change.149 The intifada drove the organization to adopt a more 
aggressive strategy. Hamas emerged as a competing force to the already established 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Compared to the PLO’s political practices 
and agenda, Hamas offered Palestinians a more violent alternative to further the 
Palestinian cause. Two factors shaped the formation of Hamas, the first being the 
historical teachings of Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, Seyyed Qutb. His call for jihad 
and the use of violence to stop the advance of Western secular ideology legitimizes 
Hamas’ actions. The second influence was the success of the Iranian Revolution led by 
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Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. The Iranian Revolution demonstrated to the Islamic world 
that a regime, illegitimate in the eyes of the people, could be successfully overthrown.150 
In the early years, Hamas support came primarily from the Gaza strip and to a 
lesser extent the West Bank. In Gaza, it is estimated that initially 20 percent of the 
Palestinians supported Hamas. In the long run, Hamas seeks to create an Islamic 
Palestinian state. However, Hamas has demonstrated a willingness to put aside that goal 
in order to collaborate with other Palestinian groups to first defeat Israel.151 The details of 
implementing an Islamic versus secular Palestine could be left for the future. 
 Fatah struggled in the 1990s to maintain its shaky majority in the PLO, and later 
PA, in the occupied territories. Hamas influence grew as diplomatic settlements like the 
Oslo Accords continued to benefit Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. As the 
intifada continued, Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups engaged in more 
violent actions against Israel. Hamas with its military wing, Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
brigade, came to be known for its suicide bomber attacks. These attacks were an effort to 
force change and inflict revenge for ongoing Israeli attacks against Palestinians in the 
occupied territories.  
C. HAMAS – SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND FRAMING 
1.  Political Opportunity 
Hamas’ 2006 parliamentary victory may be more than it had hoped for in terms of 
political gain. It is not clear whether the 2006 election is the pinnacle or just the start of 
continued political opportunities. This opportunity for Hamas can be linked to a series of 
external factors which shaped the political environment. According to Glenn Robinson, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iranian Revolution, the first Palestinian intifada and 
1993 Oslo Accords all played a role in shaping conditions on the ground.152 The Iranian 
Revolution demonstrated the capability of Islamists to create change. The first intifada 
demonstrated the Palestinian will to mobilize. Failure to establish a lasting peace 
settlement with Israel weakened the PA’s position while strengthening support for 
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Hamas. Hamas is seen as an organization which can deliver on its promises, whether 
providing social services or deterring external aggression. 
Israel’s goal of creating internal division within the PLO also benefited Hamas. 
During the 1980s, Israel worked to weaken the PLO by pitting the Islamists against 
Yasser Arafat’s secular nationalist movement.153  Granting Hamas this freedom to 
operate backfired; since then popular support for Hamas has steadily grown. Hamas to 
some is seen as an equal to Hizbullah in its ability to resist Israeli aggression. Hizbullah 
was an organizational role model based on its success in driving back the Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) from southern Lebanon. 
2.  Resource Mobilization 
Hamas, like Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood, draws its support and ability 
to mobilize from an extensive network of grassroot institutions. Glenn Robinson’s 
research categorizes these institutions into three groups: mosque-based, educational and 
medical, and political.154 The mosque plays a key role in mobilizing the masses. For the 
most part, the mosque falls outside the control of authoritarian regimes and occupying 
forces. This insulation provides a central location to gather, organize, train, disseminate 
information, and administer needed services and social programs. Further, the mosque 
can serve as a children’s school, religious training center, or health clinic. 
Hamas has developed extensive medical and education facilities to complement 
its mosque-based institutions. In 1997, Hamas opened a Scientific Medical Association, 
similar to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, to run medical and dental clinics as 
well as a blood bank.155 Educational facilities range from elementary schools to the 
Islamic University in Gaza. Hamas also provides a full spectrum of services to support 
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Palestinian Authority’s reliance on Hamas to 
provide services to Palestinians makes it difficult for PA to respond to foreign pressure to 
shutdown Hamas. Prior to Hamas’ parliamentary victory it had already become a 
significant player in the Palestinian political landscape.156 
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Hamas’ third type of institution to mobilize support is its political wing. The 
political wing seeks to win the hearts and minds of young college and university students 
in order to recruit members and support. This practice has its roots in the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood. In the years prior to the intifada Islamists began to gain ground 
over PLO and Fatah influence on campuses. This focus on recruitment is closely 
followed by the political wings work on public relations.157 Popularity and positive 
image, within and beyond the occupied territories, are linked to growing support and 
funding. These avenues of resources allow Hamas to continue its militant and social 
service operations. 
3.  Framing 
Vital to maintaining support is how Hamas frames its goals and actions. Framing 
again refers to how a movement presents or justifies its actions in a way that resonates 
with current and potential members and supporters. A personal bond, shared belief or 
identity must be established with members to motivate collective action. Hamas’ 
ideological framing includes, but is not limited to, the following concepts: Palestine is 
waqf (religious endowment), Islam is the solution, and patience.158 The concept that 
Palestine is waqf refers to land given by divine right to Muslims, which must remain 
Muslim land. An explicit goal of Hamas is to reclaim the land of Palestine. Once declared 
waqf, no Muslim generation can allow the land to be given or taken away. Reclaiming the 
land becomes a religious obligation for all Muslims.159 Declaring the land of Palestine 
waqf creates a dilemma for Hamas in that it can not accept a two state solution to resolve 
the conflict with Israel. Hamas has indicated a willingness to accept a temporary truce 
and allow future generations to resolve the issue. An alternative option is to allow other 
PA members, such as Fatah, to negotiate a solution. Hamas can honor the agreement 
without officially declaring the agreement acceptable. 
A second framing aspect, common among Islamist groups, is the notion that Islam  
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is the solution. According to Article 1, Chapter 1 of the Islamic Resistance Movement 
(Hamas) Charter: 
The basis of the Islamic Resistance Movement is Islam. From Islam it 
derives its ideas and its fundamental precepts and view of life, the 
universe, and humanity; and it judges all its actions according to Islam and 
is inspired by Islam to correct its errors.160 
By declaring Islam the solution, Hamas can legitimize its actions based on divine 
guidance. Hamas can claim to be leading Palestinians back to the true path and restoring 
Palestinian land lost due to Muslims turning away from the true path of Islam.161 
A third framing aspect is patience. Patience refers to the mindset that, in the long 
run, Hamas and Palestinians will be victorious in their battle to regain Palestine. Patience 
does not rule out action when necessary, nor does it mean transitional periods are 
unacceptable.162 An example of a transitional period could be a two state solution for 
Israel and Palestine or an initial secular government once a Palestinian state is formed. 
D. PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND GOVERNANCE 
The PA has been characterized to a great extent to be as authoritarian as many 
existing regimes in the region.163 Since 1969, Fatah dominated the PLO and later the 
PA.164 Both the PLO and PA remained resilient to Israeli and international pressure over 
the years. Even in 1982, when the PLO was forced to abandon its territorial stronghold in 
Lebanon, it remained a significant force in Middle East as well as international 
politics.165 The PLO and later PA officially represented Palestinians while Hamas 
operated in opposition to both PA governance and Israeli occupation. As mentioned, the 
Oslo peace process failure weakened PA support while boosting support for Hamas. As 
conflict with Israel continued, economic and social conditions declined. The PA seemed 
unable to improve conditions while Hamas, with its grassroots support network, provided 
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services and actively interfaced with Palestinians on a daily basis. Hamas successfully 
demonstrated the capability to make a difference. 
E. HAMAS: EXTREMISM, MODERATION, AND POLITICAL GAIN 
The United States and the European Union continue to consider Hamas a terror 
organization, not a political party. Palestinians seem to have a different perspective on 
this. Prior to the January parliamentary elections, Khalid Jadu, Hamas councilman in 
Bethlehem, was quoted as saying, “anything more than 55 seats would be an 
achievement--and probably a headache.”166 This comment by an elected councilman 
indicates Hamas wants to play a significant role in Palestinian politics, but does not 
necessarily desire complete governmental control. Graham Usher offers three reasons for 
Hamas’ success in the January elections. The first reason was overall Palestinian 
disillusionment with the lack of progress towards lasting peace with Israel. The second 
reason for Hamas’ popularity was its ability to provide services while continuing its 
armed resistance against Israel. Hamas armed resistance is believed to have forced the 
2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The third reason had less to do with Hamas and more 
to do with Fatah’s perceived misrule of the Palestinian Authority. The perception is that 
Fatah failed to establish law and order, promote economic recovery, and achieve political 
progress after Israeli withdrawal. 167 
Leading up to parliamentary elections, Hamas elected officials and candidates put 
forth a campaign platform stressing the need for change. On the issue of Israel and peace, 
Ziad Daiah, a Hamas representative in Ramallah, told reporters that “[we] are not 
interested in the Oslo-type peace process that went on for 10 years and wasted time. But 
if Israel will start new negotiations, with direct benefits for Palestinians in a useful time 
frame, we will accept that.”168 While the Israeli conflict is an issue, the campaign focused 
more on important Palestinian welfare issues. The Hamas campaign focused heavily on 
“fighting corruption, establishing good governance and restoring rule of law.”169 This 
message continued in victory speeches with the additional call to revamp public services. 
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Final parliamentary election results gave Hamas a victory; electoral analysis, 
however, told a slightly different story. Hamas won 45 of 66 (68 percent) district seats. 
On average, Hamas received 36.5 percent of the votes per district--a high enough 
percentage to beat the closest competition. That means on average 63 percent of the 
voting population in each district voted for a non-Hamas candidate. Sixty-three percent of 
the vote was dispersed between Fatah and other independent candidates. The competition 
for national seats produced similar results, where Hamas won 29 to Fatah’s 28 seats. In 
terms of voter percentage Hamas took around 44 percent of the vote. The remaining 56 
percent was divided between Fatah (42 percent) and other candidates. The margin of 
victory was closer than the bottom-line presented. After defeat, one Fatah leader stated, 
“Hamas did not win the election. Fatah lost.”170 The results would seem to affirm that 
statement. 
In reaction to the Hamas victory, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud 
Abbas, on January 29, called for an emergency meeting of parliament and exercised the 
power of the presidency to safeguard his position. Abbas declared that the Finance and 
Information ministries, as well as all PA security forces, would report directly to the 
president as opposed to the prime minister. Hamas’ Ismail Haniyeh would become the 
new prime minister as a result of elections. Hamas quickly protested, pointing out that 
Finance, Information and three of the security forces (police, civil defense, and the 
Preventive Security Force) are constitutionally mandated to fall under the prime 
minister’s purview.171 President Abbas’ actions are similar to the actions taken by other 
authoritarian regimes to maintain political control, while at the same time provide some 
level of democratic opening.  In the Egyptian case, President Mubarak allowed open 
parliamentary elections subject to carefully crafted rules and laws that guaranteed his 
position of power. 
While Hamas verbally protested the president’s governmental realignment, it took 
no action to force a reversal. Instead it chose to exercise patience and address the issue at 
a later time. Hamas knows the Preventive Security Force is Fatah’s most organized base 
of support and could pose the biggest threat or source of resistance to the new Hamas 
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government. Hamas would use patience and open dialogue with Fatah to resolve Abbas’ 
‘bloodless coup’ actions to form a government which serves all Palestinians.172 This 
position reflects a moderate approach to governance and a reluctance to force the 
formation of an Islamic state before the Palestinian society is ready. 
President Abbas stated his expectations for the new government in a February 18 
address to the newly formed parliament. His expectations included: “1) abide by existing 
agreements with Israel, including the 1993 Oslo and 1994 Oslo accords and the 2003 
‘road map’ toward peace; 2) accept negotiations as the ‘strategic and credible’ way to 
resolve the conflict; and 3) espouse peaceful rather than armed resistance.” In response to 
Abbas, Khalid Mashaal, Hamas politburo head, stated: “The Palestinian Authority was 
founded on the basis of the Oslo accords. We recognize that this is a reality, and we will 
deal with it with the utmost realism, but without neglecting our fundamental principles… 
[in] other words, we will honor our commitments, provided they serve our people and do 
not infringe on our rights, but we will not accept dictates. This, very clearly, is our 
position.” 173 
Initial reaction over the Hamas victory was mixed from within the Palestinian 
community and from states around the globe. Mohammad Dahlan, former Palestinian 
Authority Security chief and Fatah member of Parliament, was quoted as saying “Fatah is 
the first movement, the only movement, and it will remain the first and only movement 
despite all those who conspire against it…Fatah will not join a government led by 
Hamas.”174 Public protests for and against Hamas took place in the occupied territories as 
well. 
During the sixth Israel-Europe conference held February 6, 2006 in Jerusalem, 
Israel’s acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated: “There will be no recognition of a 
Palestinian government with the participation or under the control of Hamas unless three 
conditions are met: [1] the Hamas charter is changed to recognize the state of Israel’s 
right to exist as a Jewish state; [2] total dismantling of all weapons and a total cessation 
of all terrorist activity; and [3] acceptance of all agreements signed between the PA and                                                  
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the state of Israel.”175 Israel not only spoke out, but immediately imposed sanctions on 
PA as soon as Hamas deputies took their places in parliament. Sanctions included a 
“freeze” on the transfer of $55 million in monthly tax rebates to the PA.  
Members of the “Quartet” (United States, European Union, Russia, and the 
United Nations) withheld action until the new Palestinian government had formed. One 
reason for the delay was to extend the relative calm in Israel until after Israeli elections 
on March 28. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was concerned that a rise in Israeli 
domestic conflicts would favor Binyamin Netanyahu and the Likud Party. A second, and 
more important, reason was to allow Mahmoud Abbas time to consolidate his power in 
order to counter, if necessary, the new Hamas government. A third reason may have been 
to allow an international coalition against Hamas to form in order to force moderation if 
it sought to remain in power.176 
Israeli rhetoric and immediate sanctions may have been an attempt to provoke 
Hamas. An armed retaliation by Hamas would weaken its acceptance as an Islamist 
political party seeking to create a better government. Any action would merely 
demonstrate to the world it was only capable of violence. To its credit, Hamas did not 
take the bait. It kept its fighters out of the fray until the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
in June 2006. Since the violence seems to have subsided, Hamas has concentrated on 
working with Fatah to establish better governance.177 
The three Islraeli conditions for Hamas’ political legitimization were also 
adopted, to a large degree, by the United States, the European Union and United Nations; 
Russia took its own approach. Russia invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow to establish 
immediate diplomatic channels and possibly demonstrate its good will to states across the 
Middle East.178 The United States and the European Union still consider Hamas a 
terrorist organization and closed the door to diplomatic relations. In April 2006, the 
European Union decided to withhold aid to Hamas. This decision to restrict aid which 
would pay the salaries of Palestinian public employees, was due to Hamas’ on-going 
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refusal “to abide by previous Palestinian decisions to recognize Israel and renounce 
violence.”179 
In May 2006, representatives from the Quartet met to further discuss the question 
of international aid for the Palestinians. The European Union favored establishing a trust 
fund to be administered by President Mahmoud Abbas. While this would ensure funding 
would bypass Hamas, the United States remained hesitant.180 Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice said the United States was agreeable to releasing $10 million in 
support of a new medical program for Palestinians, as long as the money remained 
outside of Hamas control. Further funding would be withheld to prevent Hamas from 
using any funds to launch suicide attacks on Israel.181 Over the past decade, Hamas has 
claimed responsibility for dozens of suicide bomber attacks launched against Israel. The 
bottomline is that international funding will not be fully re-established unless Hamas or 
some other form of Palestinian government commits to the principles of nonviolence, the 
recognition of Israel, and acceptance of all previous agreements and obligations.182 
After considering initial reactions from Fatah, the United States, and Israel, 
former Hamas spokesman Mushir al-Masri was quoted as saying: “Hamas derives its 
legitimacy from the Palestinian people, not from the international community…[one] of 
the reasons they voted for us was our fixed principles. And one of these is that there will 
be no recognition of Israel as long as it occupies our land. Another is that it is the 
inalienable right of the occupied to resist the occupier.”183 
Hamas victory in the election poles made it the only legitimate group, 
constitutionally authorized, to form a new Palestinian government. Consistent with pre-
election rhetoric, Hamas remains in favor of a national coalition in which all Palestinian 
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groups will participate in government.184 The Hamas agenda seeks “to restore the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to its ‘proper relationship,’ away from the hegemony of Israel’s 
security needs and Washington’s regional designs and back to the paradigm of an illegal 
occupation and an occupied people’s right to resist it, ‘including armed resistance’.”185 
Hamas gained control of parliament and, with it, a large debt. Increased 
international pressure in the form of sanctions significantly impacts Hamas’ ability to 
govern without additional sources of funding. Without funding Hamas may be forced to 
capitulate to some degree to succeed. Hamas must put aside its historically adversarial 
relationship with Fatah. Many Palestinians seek a national coalition government, a view 
shared by pre-election Hamas. President Abbas’ actions to consolidate control over his 
security, finance and information ministries demonstrated his reluctance to hand over the 
government to Hamas. President Abbas executed a number of last-minute actions, 
approved by a Fatah-dominated parliament, in preparation for a potential constitutional 
crisis between the two branches of government once Hamas stepped in.186 
As opposed to crisis, the Hamas rise to power has taken a pragmatic course of 
action; one of control and desire to create a government for the betterment of all 
Palestinians. In September 2006, the two sides led by President Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah) 
and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas) had settled their differences and agreed to 
pursue the formation of a national unity government.187 Once formed, the new unity 
government seeks to adopt a solution which will satisfy the Quartet’s demands in order to 
re-establish international aid. 
The greatest impact of Hamas’ stunning parliamentary election victory may not 
be what it can do while in office, but simply the fact that it was elected through open and 
honest elections. The series of local races culminating in the parliamentary elections 
demonstrated the desire for change and elimination of status quo victories for Fatah. The 
victory should send a signal to other states in the region. The defeat of the long-ruling 
Fatah party at the hands of its Islamist rivals could be the beginning of a trend, according 
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to Diaa Rashwan, in which the people of the region have come to identify themselves 
more as Muslims than Arabs.188 
Fatah, starting in the late 1960s, became the controlling party of the PLO. Within 
a few years later, the PLO became the internationally recognized Palestinian 
representative with other factions taking a supporting role. Before the PA was established 
in the early 1990s, Palestinians sought to establish a democratic self ruling government. 
The belief at the time was that Israeli occupation could be defeated by democratic self-
governance.189 The 2006 election is not the first democratic election held by the PA; 
elections were held shortly after the 1993 Oslo accords. What makes local elections in 
2005 and the parliamentary election in 2006 different was better organized and 
administration. Local measures were put in place to ensure honest and transparent 
elections. The steps taken to ensure open democratic elections may become an 
expectation among the Palestinians, thus a normal practice and institutionalized into the 
political process. Since the 1970s, democracy has been an enduring goal, driven in large 
part by Palestinian civil society, and the ongoing development of a culture of resistance 
among people living under Israeli occupation.190 
Credit must also be given to PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the independent 
Palestinian Central Election Commission. Without their presence to guarantee an open 
and honest election, the 2006 parliamentary election may have turned out differently. 
Hamas might have gained a significant number of parliamentary seats; however, it is 
likely that Fatah would have been declared the winner regardless of the actual vote. The 
2006 election shows that Israel is no longer the sole democracy among predominantly 
authoritarian regimes in the region. Palestinians now set the example for other Arab 
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F. CONCLUSION 
While Hamas continues to reject the peace process and recognition of the state of 
Israel, its “unexpected landmark victory” and willingness to form a government of 
national unity has demonstrated its willingness to change. A strong but moderate 
approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may emerge. Clearly, the Fatah 
monopoly on governance is over--the door is now open for a moderate voice to emerge 
from within the Palestinian community. Hamas victory demonstrated the desire for 
change and may in fact generate a multiparty system which can be in place for future 
democratic elections. 
It is too soon to tell to what extent Hamas is willing to moderate its actions 
against Israel and seek diplomatic negotiations. In addition, its lack of domestic and 
international political experience may keep it occupied, preventing any significant 
changes until the next election. However, its ability to come to power has significantly 
transformed the political landscape by interrupting single party dominance. Open 
competitive elections and advances toward democratic reform are likely to continue for 
the Palestinians. The Palestinians cast a deciding vote for change, and because of Hamas, 
a more democratic form of governance has the chance to emerge. 
As more democratic opportunities potentially emerge, Hamas may find it 
necessary to further moderate its position in order to maintain is popularity and support 
base. If Hamas remains an obstacle to foreign aid, its support may begin to diminish. 
Palestinians desire progress and reform, they have proven their willingness to support the 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. ISLAMIC ACTIVISM AND THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE 
Over the last few decades, a number of Islamist movements decided to abandon 
violence and take a more democratic path by participating in local and national elections. 
This thesis looked specifically at the political success achieved by Hizbullah in Lebanon, 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. This research 
considered how efforts to sustain and expand Islamist movements have to some extent 
altered organizational goals and tactics as well as the regime environment in which they 
operate. Specifically, the research focused on changes in Islamist tactics to take 
advantage of political opportunities. The three cases provide insight to explain how on-
going institutionalization of Islamist groups and the need to maintain membership 
encourages moderation, political participation, and a democratic agenda. Islamists 
provide a necessary component for lasting democracy to develop in the region.  
Academic literature on democracy formation suggests lasting democracy requires 
a strong civil society.  
Specifically, it requires citizens, organized into the nongovernmental 
bodies that make up civil society, to keep elected government honest and 
prevent it from falling into familiar patterns of corruption and the arbitrary 
exercise of power.192 
Authoritarian regimes “have prevented the rise of vibrant secular civil society and 
the kind that many theorists of democratization have long believed necessary.”193 
Islamist groups, like those presented, fill the civil society void. In doing so, they become 
institutionalized and a critical component to further democracy. Islamists are currently 
the only organized group strong enough to promote democratic change. For this reason, 
any form of democracy likely to arise will have an Islamic aspect. 
Social movements can either avoid or adapt to take advantage of changes within a 
political environment. Social movement theory provided a framework to build a 
                                                 
192 Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the struggle for Islamic Democracy, New York: Farrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, 2004, 222. 
193 Ibid. 
62 
conceptual understanding of Hizbullah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas. The theory 
provided an understanding of how Islamist movements form a significant counter force to 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in the region. In addition, the framework 
provided some insight as to what extent Islamist groups are willing to forego violence to 
become nonviolent political participants. This understanding and insight was achieved by 
focusing on three aspects: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing. 
When Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Muslim Brotherhood were given an opportunity 
to participate in the formal government structure, they did not call for complete regime 
change. The primary goal continued to be reform and the removal of corruption within 
existing government structures. This demonstrates the willingness to become a 
functioning component of the political system. The fear of “one person, one vote, one 
time” does not seem to be a valid argument considering the degree Islamists are willing 
to participate and challenge existing regimes. 
1.  Lebanon and Hizbullah 
 Hizbullah’s institutionalization and desire to maintain its support base led to its 
participation in municipal and parliamentary elections. This combined with its restraint 
on violence, prior to the 2006 conflict with Israel, demonstrated the potential to be the 
example for other Islamist groups. Its actions should capture the attention of the United 
States and other Western countries interested in spreading democracy and eliminating 
radical Islamist elements in the region. 
 Hizbullah sought to become another player in the political system to provide 
Shi’ites a greater voice in Lebanese government. Hizbullah continues to play an 
instrumental role in providing social services and other forms of welfare to all Lebanese 
regardless of religious preference. The next step for Hizbullah, who considers extreme 
violence part of their repertoire, is to disarm and forego violence becoming a valid part of 
the system in international eyes.  
 Hizbullah may remain one of the most feared Islamic activist groups for the time 
being even though signs of moderation are present. Hizbullah presents a complex 
situation for Lebanon and the rest of the world. Positive signs of moderation are present 
outside the conflict with Israel and must be fostered to promote democracy. Hizbullah 
plays a significant role in filling the civil society void in southern Lebanon. Hizbullah has 
63 
created institutions that Lebanese and the Lebanese government depend on daily. As 
Hizbullah becomes more a service provider and less a militant group, the pressure to 
become less violent will likely increase. 
2.  Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s willingness to participate in Egypt’s political process, 
indirectly if necessary, suggest there is an opportunity to further institutionalize into the 
state political system. The Muslim Brotherhood went through a stage of using violence, 
but returned to non-violence working through grassroots efforts and civil society. While 
radical factions have emerged and splintered off, the Brotherhood has remained moderate 
to maintain its support base and advance its goal of reforming Egypt from the bottom-up. 
 Since 1981, the Brotherhood has maintained its position on non-violence and 
continues to pressure the Mubarak regime for political reform. The Brotherhood also 
maintains within its ideology the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Time will tell 
whether the Muslim Brotherhood seeks democracy or merely the opportunity to control 
the state. The incentive for complete regime change seems minimal. The Brotherhood’s 
popularity and deep roots in society have institutionalized the movement making it a 
significant force for change. The Brotherhood continues to promote the need for hospitals 
and clinics, better working conditions for agriculture and industrial workers, to include 
minimum wage, and an increase in governmental programs to reduce the growing 
unemployment problem. The group also promotes democratic aspects to include: free and 
open elections, freedom of speech, and human rights 
The Mubarak regime may continue to reject the Brotherhood’s request to become 
an official political party, however, facts on the ground suggest Egyptians have made a 
decision to support Muslim Brotherhood members through the ballot box. The 
Brotherhood remains an active force in the political landscape like it or not. As social 
movement theory research points out, the ability to conduct or take part in “public 
meetings; demonstrations; rallies; special-interest associations” allow a movement to 
shape the political landscape and further democratic processes.194  
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3.  Palestinian Authority and Hamas 
 For Palestinians the 2005 and 2006 elections were better organized and 
administered to ensure honesty and transparency. The steps taken to ensure open 
democratic elections may become an institutional norm for Palestinians. Since the 1970s, 
democracy has been an on-going goal, driven in large part by Palestinian civil society, 
and a culture of resistance among people living under Israeli occupation.195 
 Credit must be given to PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the independent 
Palestinian Central Election Commission. Without their presence to guarantee an open 
and honest election, the 2005-2006 results may have turned out differently. While Hamas 
would gain a number of seats, it is likely that Fatah would have been declared the winner 
regardless of actual vote. The 2006 election also shows that Israel is no longer the sole 
democracy among predominantly authoritarian regimes. Palestinians now set an example 
for other Muslims to participate in open and free democratic elections even under 
conditions of occupation.196  
Hamas victory followed by its willingness to form a government of national unity 
with Fatah demonstrated the opportunity for change. A moderate approach to resolving 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may emerge in time. For the moment, Hamas is not likely 
to moderate to any significant degree. However, its electoral victory has significantly 
transformed the political landscape halting Fatah’s single party dominance. Palestinians 
cast a deciding vote for change and through the rise of Hamas a more democratic form of 
governance has the chance to emerge. Open competitive elections are likely to continue; 
Hamas set precedence for future multiparty elections. 
In all three cases, Islamist groups demonstrated a willingness to forego violence 
to participate within current political structures. The social movement theory framework 
brought to light the complexity of each group and the complexity of the environment in 
which they operate. For Hizbullah, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas each face 
unique circumstances which constrain the degree to which they can moderate and rely on 
active political participation to advance organization goals. For Hizbullah and Hamas the 
                                                 
195 Riad Malki, “Beyond Hamas and Fatah,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 17, no. 3, July 2006, 132. 
196 Ibid. 
65 
biggest obstacle is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the Muslim Brotherhood it is the 
willingness of the Mubarak regime to take steps to advance democratic reforms. 
B. ISLAMISTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Islamist movements in the Middle East are not likely to go away anytime soon. 
Islamists form the largest organized challenge to existing authoritarian regimes and 
influence the political landscape. Whether Islamists continue to act as willing participants 
in the political systems or choose to become more radical an opposition force is 
important. Also important to consider, Islamists provide civil society institutions 
necessary to develop lasting democracy. 
The United States has the opportunity to influence the Islamist course not 
necessarily through direct policy but through its reaction to Islamist political gains.197 For 
example, Hamas was elected through a free and open democratic election which falls 
within United States goals for the region. Restricting American aid to the PA because 
Hamas is in power would likely drive the PA to seek aid from alternate sources like Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, or Syria. The United States must focus on mitigating the underlying social 
conditions promoting Islamist support in the first place. Decreasing financial aid and 
other forms of support is likely to worsen conditions on the ground furthering anti-
American sentiment among the Palestinians. Overtime, the United States may also loose 
the ability to influence a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In addition to increasing anti-American sentiment, a negative reaction by the 
United States government may promote hard-liners as opposed to moderates within 
Islamist movements.198 Hard-liners are likely to swing the movement towards adopting 
more violent means to achieve organizational goals. If Islamists shift back to more 
violent means the region will loose the opportunity for democratic change. United States 
policy and actions must be carefully crafted to promote positive change and incentives 
for Islamists to further democratic transition. 
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY 
Further study of the social conditions and reasons behind the current resurgence in 
Islamists support and the conditions which sustain their mobilization is required. Until 
actions are taken to identify and alleviate underlying social conditions that promote 
violence the potential for Islamists to rely on radical means will exist. Both Muslims and 
Islamist movements in the region seem to embrace democratic processes. The end result 
may not be the American, British, or French form of democracy but that must be decided 
by Muslims themselves.  
The recent Islamist success in local and parliamentary elections can be seen as 
both increased support for Islamist and a rejection of status quo regimes and political 
conditions in the Middle East. Elections act as a gauge to measure the willingness of 
“like-minded people who might take further action if conditions continue to incite their 
disapproval.”199 Each case presented in this thesis offers an opportunity to further study 
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